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Abstract
Markets for credit default swaps (CDS) and bonds of the same reference entity and maturity are
bound by no-arbitrage conditions. Indeed, using a large data set we show that CDS premia and par
asset swap spreads are mostly cointegrated. Nonetheless, the average CDS-bond basis (i.e. the
difference between both measures) is positive in the period 2004-2005. We detect fourteen different
economic basis drivers, which make the basis firm-specific and time-dependent. Furthermore, we
describe the basis smile, and illustrate that the average basis is the lowest for five year maturities of
corporate credits denominated in euro.
JEL codes:  C12, C19, C23, G15, G19.
Key words:   Bond, Co integration, Credit, Risk Neutrality.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 104 - NOVEMBER  2006
Table of contents
1. Introduction............................................................................................................................... 1
2.  Theoretical  considerations...................................................................................................... 3
2.1  Bond spread measures and the CDS-bond basis definition....................................................... 3
2.1.1  Spread measures for fixed-rate  bonds .......................................................................... 3
2.1.2  Asset  swap  spreads....................................................................................................... 4
2.1.3  The  CDS-bond  basis...................................................................................................... 5
2.2  Basis  drivers ............................................................................................................................... 7
2.2.1  Factors that make the basis positive ............................................................................. 8
2.2.2  Factors that make the basis negative.......................................................................... 11
2.2.3  Factors that make the basis either positive or negative .............................................. 12
3.  Empirical  observations .......................................................................................................... 13
3.1  Composition of the dataset....................................................................................................... 13
3.2  Descriptive  statistics ................................................................................................................. 16
3.2.1  Full  dataset................................................................................................................... 16
3.2.2  Basis by subset of the dataset..................................................................................... 19
3.3 Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 20
3.4 Results...................................................................................................................................... 21
3.5  Comparison with other studies ................................................................................................. 22
4.  Concluding  remarks............................................................................................................... 23
References ....................................................................................................................................... 24
Appendixes....................................................................................................................................... 27
National Bank of Belgium working paper series............................................................................... 311
1. Introduction
No-arbitrage assumptions have a key role in the pricing of financial instruments, and in
finance theory more generally. As derivative markets for credit risk transfer have
experienced tremendous growth over the past decade on the back of contract
standardization efforts, increasing market transparency and the introduction of tradable
indices, it is worthwhile examining to what extent theoretical no-arbitrage relationships
have held in this recently established segment of the global finance industry.
According to ISDA (2006), the worldwide market for credit derivatives expanded more
than fivefold in the space of two years, and amounted to 17.3 trillion USD by the end of
2005.  It is thus the fastest growing part of the 285 trillion USD global financial derivatives
market, according to figures from BIS (2006). Both BIS (2006) and Batterman et al. (2006)
argue that single-name credit default swaps (CDS) are the most important product, as
they account for more than two thirds of all outstanding credit derivatives. CDS are also
the main building blocks for many structured credit products.
The number of reference entities, mostly corporations but also sovereign issuers, has been
steadily increasing. Also the investor base has been broadening over time, and consists of
a diversity of players such as banks, brokerage firms, insurance companies, pension funds,
financial guarantors, hedge funds and asset managers. As more dealer/brokers have
developed their credit skills, market liquidity has improved and CDS bid-ask spreads
have consequently narrowed. In some cases, both outstanding volumes of credit
derivatives and daily trading activity have even outgrown the comparable cash bond
market, imposing new challenges for the credit community.
Flow of funds statistics from Federal Reserve (2006) show that, at the end of 2005,
outstanding amounts of aggregate US non-financial corporations' balance sheets exceeded
10 trillion USD and that corporate bonds accounted for 30% of the liability side.
Comparable European data (ECB (2006)) show that corporate bonds only represent 7% of
euro area non-financial corporations' aggregate balance sheets, confirming the
widespread thesis that public markets for corporate debt are more developed in the US,
while European corporate financing remains more focused on bank loans. Nevertheless,
markets for credit derivatives have known comparable growth on both sides of the
Atlantic.
A credit default swap is an agreement between two parties to exchange the credit risk of a
reference entity. The buyer of the CDS is said to buy protection, has a similar credit risk
position to selling a bond short and investing the proceeds in a risk-free asset, usually
pays a periodic fee, and profits if the reference entity has a credit event, or if the credit
worsens while the swap is outstanding. A credit event triggers a contingent payment on
the CDS and includes bankruptcy, failure to pay outstanding debt obligations, and Ɇ in
some CDS contracts Ɇ a restructuring of a bond or loan (ISDA (2003)).1Conversely, the
seller of the CDS is said to sell protection, collects the periodic fee, and profits if the credit
of the reference entity remains stable or improves while the swap is outstanding. Selling
1 However, several versions of the restructuring credit event are used in different market segments. So-called
"Modified Restructuring", which considers only certain types of restructuring as a default event, and under
which the maturity of the debt instruments eligible for delivery is restricted, is common in US investment-
grade markets (rated Baa3/BBB- and better); European CDS contracts are usually drafted with "Modified
Modified Restructuring", which imposes different limits on the bonds that can be delivered upon
restructuring; US high-yield markets (rated Ba1/BB+ and worse) do not include restructuring at all under
standard documentation.2
protection has a similar credit risk profile to maintaining a long position in a bond or a
loan. If a credit event occurs, the compensation is to be paid by the protection seller to the
buyer via either physical settlement (i.e. receiving the defaulted bond against payment of
par) or cash settlement (i.e. paying the difference between par and the bond's recovery
value), as specified in the contract. Physical settlement is the most common form of
settlement in the CDS market, and normally takes place within 30 days after the credit
event. Under physical settlement the protection buyer holds a delivery option, as in the
event of default he is free to choose from a basket of deliverable bonds.
The premium paid by the protection buyer to the seller, often called "spread", is quoted in
basis points per annum of the contract's notional value, is usually paid quarterly, and is
not based on any specific risk-free bond or benchmark interest rate. Therefore, a CDS is
like a put option written on a bond, as the protection buyer is protected from losses
incurred by a decline in the value of the bond as a result of a credit event.2
Like CDS premia, bond spreads over a risk-free benchmark mainly compensate investors
for default risk embedded in credit-risky assets. Both corporate bond and CDS spread
levels and changes are influenced by a mixture of micro- and macroeconomic
determinants such as default rates, corporate soundness (leverage, profitability, and
liquidity), ratings, equity volatility, the economic cycle, risk-free interest rates or the slope
of the yield curve.3 Besides fundamental factors, technical drivers are also important, as
prices for a specific bond and CDS are determined by supply and demand and may
include a varying liquidity premium. Credit spread modelling for both cash and
derivative instruments has focused on two types of frameworks. Structural models of
credit risk build on Merton's original idea that both debt and equity can be modelled as
options on the firm's assets. Reduced-form models of credit risk, also called intensity-
based models, look upon defaults as exogenous rare events that can be modelled by a
jump process.4
It can be shown that, under certain assumptions, investing in a floating rate note or
investing in a credit-risky bond together with a buying a fixed-to-floating interest rate
swap (combined position known as an asset swap), has the same economic risk profile as
selling protection in a CDS. As a result, no-arbitrage arguments imply that the CDS
premium should reflect the LIBOR spread on an equivalent asset swap. Previous studies
(Blanco et al. (2005), Chan-Lau and Kim (2004), Norden and Weber (2004) and Zhu (2004))
have indeed found that this long-term theoretical equilibrium relationship broadly holds,
though they have also shown that short-term deviations can be considerable. While
evidence has remained thinly-based, analysis of lead-lag relationships has shown that
CDS tend to lead cash bond markets, hence indicating that some price discovery exists.
We will extend this field of research, both by describing in great detail the economic
determinants of the CDS-bond basis (hereinafter also denoted simply as the "basis"), and
by applying cointegration analysis on a new and significantly richer dataset. The interest
of this paper is threefold. Firstly, it enables to get an in-depth understanding of the
differences between two important, related segments of today's financial markets (credit-
risky bonds and credit default swaps). Secondly, it arms the reader/investor to assess
2 See Skinner and Townend (2002) or Whetten et al. (2004) for a description of the option-like characteristics of
a CDS.
3 See e.g. Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002), Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Van Landschoot (2004) and many others.
4  Examples of structural and reduced-form models of credit risk are Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and
Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), respectively. More exhaustive overviews of credit risk models are presented in a
large number of papers, such as Meng and Gwilym (2004).3
apparent arbitrage opportunities that may arise between those two market segments.
Thirdly, it bridges between rigorousness of previous academic studies and invaluable
hands-on experience of market participants.
Our conclusions are (i) we show that credit default swap premia and par asset swap
spreads are mostly cointegrated, suggesting the existence of a long-run equilibrium
relationship; (ii) for the period 2004-2005 the average and median CDS-bond basis is
positive; (iii) the basis tends to be positively correlated with the level of spreads; (iv) the
CDS-bond basis is both firm-specific and time dependent, and is determined by a
smorgasbord of 14 hard-to-proxy fundamental and technical factors; (v) we find evidence
of the basis smile across rating buckets; (vi) the basis for emerging market sovereign
entities is significantly higher than for corporate issuers; (vii) the basis is the lowest in the
most liquid part of the CDS curve, i.e. the 5-year segment; (viii) the basis of credits
denominated in EUR is significantly lower than for contracts in USD.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the first, theoretical part we define
and discuss measures of bond spreads, we formally define the CDS-bond basis and we
then outline in detail the various fundamental and technical basis drivers. The second,
empirical part first outlines the characteristics of the dataset and methodology, then
presents our results and discusses them in the light of the outcome of prior studies. We
end with some concluding remarks.
2. Theoretical considerations
2.1. Bond spread measures and the CDS-bond basis definition
2.1.1. Spread measures for fixed-rate bonds
Our quest for the "holy scale", finding an appropriate definition of the CDS-bond basis,
starts with the observation that the trading and valuation of credit-risky bonds in the cash
market is based on a spread quotation. Ignoring the risk premium, tax and liquidity
aspects, credit spreads are designed to compensate investors for expected loss from
default. Explaining the basis requires an understanding of inherent characteristics of key
spread measures used to compare cash and CDS markets (Batterman and Nordqvist
(2005)). A CDS premium is a relatively straightforward measure, which tends to reflect
the perceived credit risk of the reference entity in a pure way. However, different bond
spread concepts exist, depending on the choice of the risk-free benchmark and the
computational complexity. This complexity is a function of the accuracy by which
maturity matching is accomplished, and depends on whether timing of cash-flows is
considered, by explicitly taking into account the shape of the benchmark term structure.
While later in this paper it will be argued that asset swap spreads are the appropriate
spread measure to compare CDS premia with, it is useful to first review concepts of other,
often more intuitive, widely used spread measures.
Originally, bond spreads were mostly calculated as the simple yield-to-maturity
differential between a credit-risky bond and a credit risk-free benchmark bond. The
closest on-the-run Treasury bond, in terms of maturity, was commonly chosen as the risk-
free benchmark. This concept of a "spread to a benchmark Treasury bond" can be refined by
interpolating the Treasury curve in order to exactly match the risky bond's maturity.
Interpolation to obtain a "spread to the interpolated Treasury curve" m a y  b e  c a r r i e d  o u t
roughly by drawing a straight line between the yields of the closest longer and shorter4
Treasury issues, or, alternatively, may result from yield curve estimation procedures, like
the one proposed by Nelson and Siegel (1987), providing a smooth curve shape.
Traditionally, Treasury bonds were used mostly as a risk-free benchmark by bond traders,
but nowadays interest rate swap rates are the most common reference, certainly for
derivative traders, since (i) the swap curve is actually a more liquid curve in many
developed markets, (ii) the swap curve does not suffer from temporary humps due to
repo specialness, as on-the-run Treasuries do, (iii) the swap curve is less influenced by
regulatory and taxation issues, (iv) LIBOR/swap rates correspond closely to the funding
cost of many market participants. Also, academics seem to have adopted swap instead of
Treasury benchmark curves. Previous studies on the pricing of CDS, such as Houweling
and Vorst (2003), and on the analysis of the CDS-bond basis, such as Blanco et al. (2005),
have built their analysis using swap benchmark curves.
The yield-to-maturity differential between a credit-risky fixed-rate bond and the
interpolated swap rate is denoted as the "I-spread" (I from Interpolated). It may be noted
that the difference between the spread to the interpolated Treasury curve and the I-spread
is equal to the swap spread. A more refined measure that takes into account the full term
structure of the benchmark swap curve for discounting each of the cash-flows at its own
rate, is denoted as "Z-spread" (zero volatility spread), sometimes also called "stripped
spread". Z-spread is defined as the spread that must be added to a given benchmark zero
swap curve so that the sum of the bond's discounted cash flows equals its price, with each
cash flow discounted at its own rate.5
2.1.2. Asset swap spreads
While the above spread concepts were developed for calculating spreads on fixed-rate
securities, Francis et al. (2003) found that, in terms of cash flow profile, a CDS is most
readily comparable with a par floating rate note funded at LIBOR or with an asset
swapped fixed-rate bond financed in the repo market. Duffie (1999) has formalized this
argument for floaters, under the assumptions that there are no transaction costs or tax
effects. However, floating rate notes are much less commonly traded securities than fixed-
rate bonds, so we will focus on the asset swap structure. Through an asset swap an
investor can separate interest rate risk from credit risk, transforming fixed payments into
a floater. Such a fixed-to-floating asset swap is an over-the-counter package product
consisting of two simultaneous trades:  buying a fixed-rate bond and entering into a fixed-
to-floating interest rate swap (IRS) of the same maturity. The fixed leg of the IRS is the
bond's coupon, while the floating leg is LIBOR augmented by an agreed amount (in bp.),
denoted the "asset swap spread" (ASW-spread).
Francis et al. (2003) further distinguish between par asset swaps and market asset swaps.6
In a par asset swap, the asset swap buyer effectively buys the package from the asset
swap seller at par, regardless of the cash price of the bond, and the notional amount of the
swap is equal to the face value of the underlying bond. A par asset swap is the most
5 It should be noted that neither of the above spread measures is able to account for options which might be
embedded in a bond (e.g. callable or putable securities). In a so-called "option-adjusted spread" (OAS),
appropriate adjustments have been made. According to Galdi et al. (2000), OAS is the parallel basis point shift
applied to the par coupon government curve in an option pricing model that produces a theoretical price
equal to the corporate bond's actual market price. As bonds with embedded options will be excluded from the
empirical exercise, we will not consider OAS.
6 Francis et al. (2003) also denote both structures as par in - par out asset swaps versus market in - market out
asset swaps. Calamaro and Thakkar (2004) use the terminology par asset swaps versus proceeds asset swaps.5
commonly traded asset swap package. When the deal is initiated, the present value of all
cash flows must be zero, so that any upfront difference due to the bond trading away
from par will be accounted for in the asset swap spread. Consequently, the "market asset
swap spread" equals the "par asset swap spread" divided by the dirty price of the bond on a
percentage basis.
2.1.3. The CDS-bond basis
Exhibit 1 is an adapted version of a scheme presented by Hjort et al. (2002). It illustrates
how, for an investor who funds himself at LIBOR, a combined position of buying
protection in a CDS and entering into an asset swap in which the fixed coupon payments
of a bond that trades at par are swapped against a stream of floating rates is fully hedged
in any state of the world. Before maturity, there are two possibilities: no default (left-hand
side) and default (right-hand side, assuming physical delivery and unwinding of the IRS).
In both cases, the combined position is credit risk-free. Therefore, the CDS premium
should match the asset swap spread. If the difference between the CDS premium and the
asset swap spread were to diverge from zero, that would constitute a theoretical arbitrage
opportunity.
Exhibit 1 – The theoretical no-arbitrage relationship between credit default swaps and
asset swaps
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Comparison of asset swap spreads with CDS premia requires fulfilment of one important
condition: the two credit risk sensitive instruments need to have the same remaining
maturity. As the bond and the CDS will rarely trade at exactly the same remaining
maturity, some calculation will be needed to match maturities. Both interpolation and
yield curve estimation techniques may be considered to avoid maturity mismatches.7
Even if the par asset swap spread is an appropriate bond spread measure to compare CDS
premiums with, there may be room for further refinement. Calamaro and Thakkar (2004)
argue that in quantifying the CDS-bond basis to express an outright rich/cheap judgment,
both probability of default Ɇ which may vary through a bond's lifecycle Ɇ and recovery
on default must be considered in addition. Also, when a credit event occurs, the interest
rate swap of an asset swap package persists, unless the investor has opted to enter into an
extinguishable IRS. However, that is an illiquid instrument, so allowance should also be
made for the potential cost of unwinding the IRS in an asset swap.
7 Under 3.1. it will be discussed in detail how maturity matching has been accomplished for our dataset.6
Many financial institutions have built their own proprietary models to reflect these issues
in their in-house assessment of the CDS-bond basis.8 Nevertheless, according to Memani
et al. (2005a) the biases of using asset swap spreads instead of those more refined spread
concepts are small and negligible, certainly for low-spread securities. The true credit risk
is reported to be very close to the asset swap spread, the interest rate risk is almost
perfectly hedged, and an asset swap is said to be a very convenient structure to trade as a
package. Also, Calamaro and Thakkar (2004) acknowledge that, for relative value
considerations in the high grade market, assessing asset swaps versus CDS may be
sufficient to extract value from the basis between the two, and Beinstein et al. (2005) point
out that, for most investment grade bonds, the difference in relation to par equivalent
CDS spreads will be "within a few basis points". Felsenheimer (2004) goes even further by
stating that in any case the appropriate spread measure for comparing cash bonds with
CDS is the asset swap spread. Also, Francis et al. (2003) define the CDS-bond basis as the
CDS premium minus the asset swap spread.
For the purpose of this paper, we also define the CDS-bond basis (the basis) as the
difference between the CDS premium and the maturity matched par asset swap spread. If
this difference is higher (lower) than zero, we say that the basis is positive (negative). The
CDS premium for a given CDS ticker n at time t is denoted as CDSn,t, and the
corresponding maturity matched par asset swap spread as ASWn,t. Then the basis Bn,tcan
be written as the simple difference:
) 1 ( , , , t n t n t n ASW CDS B   
A basis which diverges from zero might present an arbitrage opportunity. In the case of a
positive (negative) basis, a positive (negative) basis trade can be set up, in which the cash
bond is sold (bought) in an asset swap and CDS protection is sold (bought) at the same
time. However, an investor should be aware that not every apparently attractive basis
trade will necessarily be a free lunch, as transaction costs (bid-ask spreads) are significant
in credit markets and the basis is determined by a complex set of factors, some of which
cannot be controlled in a quantitative manner. In the following section we will look into
these various economic basis drivers.
8 Credit Suisse defines the "par equivalent spread" as the modeled spread of a par bond that has the same
implied probability of default as the traded bond (Memani et al. (2005b)). Citigroup and Bank of America
introduced "probability-adjusted spread" and "par CDS equivalent spread" along the same lines (Rajan et al.
(2004b) and Taksler et al. (2006)). JPMorgan introduced both probability of default and recovery rates into the
measure, and define a five-step process to derive "bond equivalent par CDS spreads" which permit direct
comparison between bonds and CDS while at the same time adjusting for coupon features and for the cost of
unwinding the IRS in case of default (Stephenson and Paras (2003)). Lehman Brothers derives a "bond implied
CDS spread" from a bond-implied CDS spread term structure (Mashal et al. (2005) and Pedersen (2006)).
Finally, Deutsche Bank considers the concept of "funding spread" as the appropriate bond spread measure
(Calamaro and Thakkar (2004)). In most of these examples, adjustment for time varying probability of default,
and hence consideration of the credit term structure, has been accomplished by deriving implied probabilities
of default from CDS curves which have, contrary to most cash bonds, a clearly defined and traded curve, at
least for important market participants.7
2.2. Basis drivers
Although the no-arbitrage condition between CDS premia and asset swap spreads
predicts the basis to be equal to zero, this relation does not always hold in practice. Indeed,
market data shows that the basis can be either positive or negative, and that its value is
both firm-specific and time-dependent. A smorgasbord of factors determines both the
direction and the amplitude of the basis. This section will outline the various basis
determinants that have been described by both academic and market sources.
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Table 1 shows that basis drivers can be ordered across two different axes. First, factors can
be grouped according to their expected impact, as they can either cause the basis to
become positive or negative, or even have a mixed effect depending on the precise
situation. Second, factors can be grouped according to whether they are more
fundamental or technical in nature. Adopting conventions as laid out in the pivotal article
by McAdie and O'Kane (2001), we define fundamental factors as reasons that relate to the
precise specification of a CDS contract that can make it behave differently from a cash
bond, while technical factors refer to the nature of the markets in which both contracts are
traded.
In general terms, factors that add risk to the CDS relative to the asset swap tend to
increase the basis, while factors that add risk to the asset swap relative to the CDS tend to
decrease the basis. Also, factors that tend to increase the return of an asset swap relative to
a CDS drive the basis upwards, while factors that tend to increase the return of a CDS
relative to an asset swap have the effect of depressing the basis.
It is clear that not all features are equally powerful and that, depending on the specific
reference entity and moment in time, some factors can outweigh others in importance,
while some determinants might even be totally irrelevant under certain conditions. While
we define 14 different economic basis drivers, it is our understanding that four of them
(i.e. the CDS cheapest to deliver option, difficulties in shorting cash bonds in a context of
structural demand for protection, relative liquidity in segmented markets, and synthetic
CDO issuance) are the main determinants of the CDS-bond basis.
Knowing that it is already difficult to quantify, or even find a proxy, for the assumed
impact of some individual factors, it need hardly be said that assessing the combined
effect of all determinants together on the basis of a specific CDS-asset swap combination is
a very challenging task for a credit trader. When faced with an apparently attractive
arbitrage opportunity, one should always question to what extent all relevant basis
drivers are reflected in the observed basis measure. If this measure is judged to be8
appropriate, then the issue is whether sufficient liquidity is available in both market
segments (CDS and bonds) to permit the profitable execution of arbitrage trades, after
having accounted for the existence of transaction costs.
2.2.1. Factors that make the basis positive
   A.  Fundamental  determinants
(i) CDS cheapest to deliver option9
In the case of physical delivery after a credit event, a protection buyer holds a delivery
option, as he is free to choose the cheapest from a basket of deliverable bonds. Since it is
likely that protection sellers will end up owning the least favourable alternative if
different deliverable bonds are trading at different spreads, they should receive a higher
premium to compensate for this risk. As a result, the cheapest to deliver option tends to
increase the basis.
Depending on the type of credit event and the composition of the basket of deliverables,
this ability to switch out of one asset into a cheaper one to deliver into the contract can be
of significant value. The higher the likelihood of occurrence of a credit event and the
wider the spectrum of deliverable bonds and loans in terms of covenants, maturities and
coupons, the more valuable this delivery option may be, though it is difficult to quantify
its exact value.
Given the exponential growth of outstanding derivative contracts, following a default
there can be heavy demand from protection buyers for the cheaper cash bonds, which can
lead to a market squeeze on the deliverable obligations, with the paradoxical effect of
their price rising. This phenomenon has recently been observed at several occasions, e.g.
in case of the Delphi and Calpine defaults, that occurred in October 2005 and December
2005, respectively. It tends to reduce the value of the cheapest to deliver option, and has
revived market participants' interest in developing standardized cash settlement
procedures.
(ii) CDS premia are floored at zero10
Asset swap spreads for high quality issuers (e.g. AAA/Aaa names) may well trade at
levels below LIBOR, given that markets for interbank lending and interest rate swaps are
generally populated by institutions that carry an AA-/Aa3 rating. Conversely, default
swap premiums cannot be negative since these are insurance-like contracts, in which no
protection seller would be accepting a negative premium. Consequently, the basis for
reference entities that are perceived to be very creditworthy tends to be positive.
9 See Beinstein et al. (2005), Blanco et al. (2005), Calamaro and Thakkar (2004), Chan-Lau and Kim (2004),
Cossin and Lu (2005), Crouch and Marsh (2005), Felsenheimer (2004), Francis et al. (2003), Hjort et al. (2002),
Hull et al. (2004), McAdie and O'Kane (2001), Mc Pherson et al. (2002), Taksler et al. (2006), Zhu (2004).
10 See Hjort et al. (2002), McAdie and O'Kane (2001).9
(iii) CDS restructuring clause - technical default11
The risk of technical default is the risk that the definitions or the legal structure used in
the default protection documentation of the CDS differ from those which would
constitute default on the cash bond. If, under specific circumstances, protection sellers in a
CDS are forced to pay out on an event that is not a full default, a higher CDS premium
will be required, thereby increasing the basis. More specifically, CDS contracts that
include the restructuring credit event are vulnerable to divergence from bond
documentation, despite improvements by ISDA in standardizing and harmonizing CDS
legal documentation.
(iv) Bond trading below par12
A seller of protection in a CDS is exposed to the par amount following a credit event,
while fixed rate bonds can trade significantly below par as a result of an increase in risk-
free rates or credit spreads after the security has been issued to the market. In such a case,
the seller of a CDS contract Ɇ who guarantees the par amount Ɇ will require a higher
spread than the comparable bond investor who is exposed to lower risk, increasing the
basis. Contrary to many other basis determinants, in the case of a bond price that diverges
from 100, the impact on the basis can be mathematically estimated, even if an assumption
about the expected recovery rate will be required.
(v) Profit realization13
Locking in a profit on a CDS position requires entering into an offsetting transaction, in
which a lower premium is paid. Hence the full mark-to-market can only be monetized by
waiting until both trades mature. However, if default occurs during the remaining
lifetime, both contracts will trigger a credit event, remaining spread payments will
terminate, and any further anticipated gain is lost. As a compensation for this risk, an
investor would require a higher premium when selling a CDS contract, which should
widen the basis.
However, two caveats apply. Firstly, while selling a bond enables gains to be locked in
immediately, it can be argued that terminating an asset swap also requires entering into
an offsetting interest rate swap. However, the credit risk involved in an outstanding IRS is
perceived to be lower than for an outstanding CDS, at least for lower rated reference
entities. Secondly, while profit locking on a CDS for an end-investor does indeed require
entering into another CDS contract, early termination services exist, which organize
novation of outstanding default swaps between dealer/brokers participating in the
system.
11 See Calamaro and Thakkar (2004), Felsenheimer (2004), Francis et al. (2003), Hull et al. (2004), McAdie and
O'Kane (2001), Mc Pherson et al. (2002), Zhu (2004).
12 See Beinstein et al. (2005), Blanco et al. (2005), Cossin and Lu (2005), Crouch and Marsh (2005), Francis et al.
(2003), Hjort et al. (2002), McAdie and O'Kane (2001), Rajan et al. (2004a), Mc Pherson et al. (2002), Zhu (2004).
13 See Beinstein et al. (2005), Felsenheimer (2004), McAdie and O'Kane (2001).10
B. Technical determinants
(vi) Demand for protection - difficulties in shorting cash bonds14
Banks constantly shed credit risk, as they often hedge exposure of the loan book in order
to be able to maintain a client relationship in full respect of all applicable risk limits,
including concentration constraints. For these hedging purposes, banks tend to buy
protection in CDS markets, as shorting in the cash bond markets is less convenient.
Indeed, shorting the cash market tends to be difficult, as the bond needs to be sourced in a
fairly illiquid and short-dated repo market in which bonds additionally might trade on
special, making it expensive to borrow the bond. This drives out the CDS premium
relative to cash bond spreads, hence widening the basis. This is all the more the case for
reference entities which experience a negative market sentiment due to deteriorating
credit quality.
Furthermore, a long bond investor can fund his position in the repo market at a rate that
is close to LIBOR, as it constitutes a collateralized loan. However, if the asset becomes
special and its repo yield decreases, the investor would be able to roll over the funding at
a cheaper level. Since such repo optionality is not present in a CDS, it tends to further
increase the basis.
(vii) Issuance patterns15
CDS spreads are often driven wider by market flows during and following the issuance of
a convertible bond. Hedge funds specialized in convertible arbitrage strategies are
frequently reported to provide a strong bid to the new issue as a means of acquiring a
cheap source of equity volatility. At the same time, they hedge out the credit risk by
buying protection in the CDS market, hence driving default swap spreads up and the
basis wider.
Also, bond syndication desks which hedge forthcoming straight issuance, and banks
participating in syndicated loans, will usually buy protection in the CDS markets, causing
the basis to widen. Conversely, new bond issues are often launched in the primary market
at a somewhat higher spread in order to provide attractive levels for investors to step in,
driving the CDS-bond basis back down.
14 See Blanco et al. (2005), Calamaro and Thakkar (2004), Cossin and Lu (2005), Crouch and Marsh (2005),
Felsenheimer (2004), Francis et al. (2003), Hjort et al. (2002), McAdie and O'Kane (2001), Mc Pherson et al.
(2002), Rajan et al. (2004a), Taksler et al. (2006), Zhu (2004).
15 See Calamaro and Thakkar (2004), Felsenheimer (2004), Francis et al. (2003), Hjort et al. (2002), McAdie and
O'Kane (2001), Taksler et al. (2006).11
2.2.2. Factors that make the basis negative
   A.  Fundamental  determinants
(viii) Funding issues16
The supposed equality between CDS premia and asset swap spreads is derived under the
assumption that cash investors can fund themselves at LIBOR. However, many market
participants only obtain funding above LIBOR levels, prompting them to obtain credit
exposure by selling CDS rather than by acquiring asset swaps, driving the CDS-bond
basis down. On balance, the greater the ratio of lower-rated versus higher-rated market
participants, the more negative the basis should be. In addition, investors are exposed to
future changes in the cost of funding (relative versus LIBOR), while a default swap locks
in an effective funding rate of LIBOR flat, reinforcing the effect. The fact that different
investors may fund themselves at different rates implies that the actual no-arbitrage level
of a CDS versus asset swap trade varies for different market participants.
(ix) Counterparty default risk17
The two contractors in a CDS bear exposure to each other's ability to fulfil their respective
obligations throughout the life of the trade. While the protection seller's counterparty risk
is fairly contained, the buyer of protection faces greater uncertainty since, following a
credit event, the difference between par and the recovery value of the defaulted asset is at
stake, should the protection seller default on the back of the reference entity's credit event.
Protection buyers will, as a form of compensation, tend to be only willing to pay a lower
premium, reducing the basis.
Buying a cash bond is a fairly straightforward transaction that involves no additional
layer of counterparty risk. However, entering into an asset swap also involves an interest
rate swap that overlays the reference bond, and funding of the purchase of the bond often
takes place through repo. These additional transactions create additional counterparty
risks. However, both of these risks are considered as being minimal.
(x) Accrued interest differentials on default18
In the event of default, in most cases a bond does not pay accrued interest as issuers rarely
compensate investors for any coupons owed. In contrast, under standard CDS
documentation, protection buyers must pay the accrued premium up to the credit event.
While the expected present value of this contractual difference, which is a function of the
coupon size and the probability of default, is typically small, it tends to drive the CDS-
bond basis more negative.
16  See Calamaro and Thakkar (2004), Crouch and Marsh (2005), Francis et al. (2003), Hjort et al. (2002),
McAdie and O'Kane (2001), Taksler et al. (2006).
17 See Felsenheimer (2004), Francis et al. (2003), Hjort et al. (2002), Hull et al. (2004), McAdie and O'Kane
(2001), Mc Pherson et al. (2002), Zhu (2004).
18 See Beinstein et al. (2005), Calamaro and Thakkar (2004), McAdie and O'Kane (2001), Zhu (2004).12
(xi) Bond trading above par19
As argued above, a bond trading below par makes the basis positive. As a corollary, and
following the same logic, a bond trading above par causes the basis to be negative. Indeed,
if a bond trades at a price above 100, the seller of a CDS contract who guarantees the par
amount will settle for a correspondingly lower spread.
   B.  Technical  determinant
(xii) Synthetic CDO issuance20
Issuance in structured credit markets, and in markets for synthetic collateralized debt
obligations in particular, has been rising exponentially over the past few years and is
expected to continue to grow. At the same time, this is a key factor that has been driving
CDS spreads tighter and, as a result, depressing the CDS-bond basis. Indeed, in order to
be able to sell synthetic credit risk to investors via these structures, the originators will
typically have to take an offsetting long credit risk position by selling protection to hedge
the transaction. The impact may vary significantly among individual credits, as it is a
function of the relative liquidity of a reference name in the CDS and cash bond markets.
2.2.3. Factors that make the basis either positive or negative
   A.  Fundamental  determinant
(xiii) Coupon specificities21
Some bonds carry clauses triggering a coupon step-up in the event of a ratings
downgrade, which adds another layer of protection for bondholders that is not reflected
in a similar default swap position. As a result, the CDS should trade wider than this bond,
i.e. the basis should be positive and widening in case of a negative rating trend or
weakening market sentiment for the issuer. Alternatively, coupon step-down clauses in
the wake of a rating upgrade are also sometimes included in a bond structure, and these
should imply a negative basis.
Coupon payment conventions also play a role; e.g., in case of US corporate bonds, coupon
payments are made semi-annually on a 30/360 day-count convention, while CDS premia
are due quarterly and accrue using an actual/360 convention. It is of course possible to
control for this factor, but the investor who is considering a basis trade should be aware.
19 See Beinstein et al. (2005), Blanco et al. (2005), Cossin and Lu (2005), Crouch and Marsh (2005), Francis et al.
(2003), Hjort et al. (2002), McAdie and O'Kane (2001), Mc Pherson et al. (2002), Rajan et al. (2004a), Zhu (2004).
20 See Beinstein et al. (2005), Calamaro and Thakkar (2004), Felsenheimer (2004), Francis et al. (2003), Hjort et
al. (2002), McAdie and O'Kane (2001), Mc Pherson et al. (2002), Rajan et al. (2004a), Taksler et al. (2006).
21 See Beinstein et al. (2005), Francis et al. (2003), Hjort et al. (2002), McAdie and O'Kane (2001), Taksler et al.
(2006).13
B. Technical determinant
(xiv) Relative liquidity in segmented markets22
Prices in both cash bond and CDS markets are a function of their specific supply and
demand dynamics, which tend to exhibit diverging characteristics in these two,
segmented markets. Despite ongoing integration of global financial markets, blurring of
frontiers, and the existence of arbitrageurs, who are technically able to exploit price
discrepancies between the two markets, this is still one of the main reasons for the
existence of the CDS-bond basis. The basis will depend on the relative liquidity in both
markets, and will compensate an investor who invests in the less liquid segment.
On the demand side, the investor base of the two markets is intrinsically different. A wide
range of investors populates cash bond markets, though to a large extent bonds end up in
buy-and-hold portfolios of funded investors, such as insurance companies and pension
funds. Conversely, protection sellers in CDS markets are often more dynamic investors,
such as hedge funds and proprietary trading desks, which can easily leverage their
exposure due to the unfunded nature of derivatives. Different investor types are also
governed by different regulatory frameworks and restrictions, while tax treatment may
vary across products that are equivalent in economic terms. Finally, the off-balance-sheet
nature of CDS is an incentive for some types of investors to sell protection in derivatives
markets rather than to buy cash bonds outright.
Also, on the supply side, the two markets are organized in a different fashion. Protection
buyers in CDS markets are often institutions such as banks that want to shed risks in a
structural way. On the other hand, bond issuers such as corporations and sovereign states
drive bond market supply according to their financing needs. Hence, on a maturity scale,
the cash market for a particular credit name only trades large, liquid, bonds where issuers
have decided to sell benchmark bonds into the market. Furthermore, these issues roll
down the curve as time elapses, and only a few creditors have regular issuance programs
spread out across the curve. On the other hand, CDS markets ensure liquidity around
fixed maturities: the five-year segment attracts by far the most liquidity, while three-,
seven- and ten-year CDS are also frequently traded maturities.
3. Empirical observations
3.1. Composition of the dataset
Conducting empirical work on opaque or developing segments of financial markets is
challenging, as data sources are often proprietary and/or lack accuracy and completeness.
In general terms, one could describe corporate bond markets as "not very transparent" or
"opaque", and CDS markets as "recent", "emerging", or "developing". It was therefore
surprising to find that it was feasible to construct a fairly large and Ɇ in our view Ɇ
reliable dataset based on data publicly available on Bloomberg. The final dataset consists
of daily observations for the period January 2004 to December 2005 for 144 combinations
of CDS premia and corresponding maturity matched par asset swap spreads, representing
a total of 70,847 observations of the CDS-bond basis.
22 See Beinstein et al. (2005), Blanco et al. (2005), Chan-Lau and Kim (2004), Cossin and Lu (2005), Crouch and
Marsh (2005), Francis et al. (2003), Hjort et al. (2002), Hull et al. (2004), McAdie and O'Kane (2001), Mc Pherson
et al. (2002), Rajan et al. (2004a), Taksler et al. (2006), Zhu (2004).14
To collect the bond (and thus asset swap spread) data, we reduced, in several steps, the
set of bonds of the combined investment-grade and high-yield Merrill Lynch universes as
available at the end of 2005. First, only bonds denominated in EUR and USD were
retained. Second, all non-senior debt (such as subordinated or securitized issues) was
removed from the sample. Third, all US Treasury notes and bonds were left out. Fourth,
securities with embedded options were removed, and only bullet bonds were retained.
Fifth, only securities with maturity not diverging more than five years from the term of
the corresponding CDS tickers were retained. Sixth, in order to restrict the sample to
liquid and frequently traded bonds, bonds with less than 500 million USD outstanding
were removed. After application of all these filters, the reduced sample consisted of 714
bonds.
In order to collect the CDS data, all CDS tickers that had observations over the period
2004-2005 were initially gathered. Only senior CDS were retained with a 3-, 5- or 10-year
tenor, for which at least one corresponding bond was available (i.e. with both a matching
reference entity and denominated in the same currency), so the number of CDS tickers
decreased 176. Consequently, daily par asset swap spreads and CDS premia for the period
2004-2005 were downloaded. A first look at the data showed that, in some instances, there
were large gaps in the time series, so the dataset was then further restricted to 607 bonds
and 165 CDS tickers. These represented 270,273 asset swap spread observations and
84,213 observations of CDS premia.
Maturity matching of the asset swap spreads towards the CDS term was carried out by
applying the following set of rules. At each daily point in time, the remaining maturity of
all available bonds (with the same reference entity and denominated in the same currency)
was evaluated for each individual CDS ticker. Two methods were considered: "direct
matching" and "linear interpolation". Direct matching was applied for days when only one
bond was available with the remaining term to maturity of that bond diverging less than
one year from the CDS term.23 Linear interpolation of asset swap spreads towards the
corresponding CDS term was applied when at least two bonds were available, one with a
lower and one with a longer term to maturity than the CDS term. Where multiple
maturity matched asset swap spreads were available (through either direct matching or
linear interpolation), the arithmetic mean of these calculated spreads was taken as the
final bond market reading for that observation.
It is important to recognize that the assessment of bond availability for each CDS ticker
was carried out for each individual daily observation. As a result, the time series of
maturity matched asset swap spreads corresponding to one specific CDS ticker may be
composed of price data taken from different bonds for different periods in time.
Furthermore, as bond availability has been evaluated at each point in time, this leads to a
further reduction in the size of the dataset. Indeed, after application of the above
procedures, a final dataset was left, consisting of two years of daily observations for 144
CDS premia, their corresponding maturity matched par asset swap spreads, and the
difference between the two measures, i.e. the CDS-bond basis. The total number of basis
observations amounts to 70,847, i.e. an average number of 492 observations per CDS ticker.
23 Quarterly rolls of CDS contracts were left out of the analysis, so at each point in time the remaining
m at u ri t y o f  t he  C D S  was  as s u m e d t o  b e  e q u a l t o  i t s t e rm . C o r re c t i ng f o r  t he  e xac t  C D S  m at u ri t y w o u l d
produce only a very marginal improvement in the results, but would drastically complicate the data handling
process.15
Table 2 - Number of reference entities by rating and by sector
Aaa Aa A Baa Ba Total
Basic Materials 2 3 5
Communications 5 5 1 11
Consumer, Cyclical 1 3 4 1 9
Consumer, Non-cyclical 1 4 5 1 11
Diversified 1 1
Energy 1 1 2
Financial 3 12 14 3 1 33
Government 4 2 5 11
Industrial 1 2 4 3 10
Utilities 2 6 2 10
Total 4 19 42 29 9 103
Sector
Rating
One reference entity may have multiple CDS tickers, denominated in different currencies
and/or with different maturities, so the number of reference entities is lower than the
number of CDS tickers. Table 2 shows that the dataset covers 103 different reference
entities. 94 of them are considered as investment-grade (Baa or better, following Moody's
rating scale) and 9 of them as high-yield.24The majority of reference entities carry a rating
A (42 out of 103). From the 103 reference entities, 11 are emerging market sovereigns (the
government sector) and 92 are corporations. The financial sector is well represented with
33 entities, but it must be recognized that in this sector a variety of institutions such as
banks, brokers, insurers and finance companies are grouped together. Six sectors are all
represented by 9 to 11 companies, while the three remaining sectors (basic materials,
energy and diversified) only consist of a small number of corporations.
Table 3 - Number of CDS tickers by currency and by term to maturity
EUR USD Total
3 26 15 41
5 56 38 94
10 4 5 9
Total 86 58 144
Currency
Term
In table 3 the CDS tickers of the final dataset are broken down according to their currency
and term. It is no surprise to observe that the biggest part of the dataset consists of 5-year
contracts, as that is generally perceived to be the most liquid part of the CDS curve. For
that reason, most other empirical studies, including Blanco et al. (2005), Chan-Lau and
Kim (2004), Norden and Weber (2004) and Zhu (2004), actually only considered the five-
year tenor. However, we are able to extend the analysis, mainly to the front end of the
credit curve (41 contracts with a 3-year term), but also to the long end (9 contracts with a
10-year term). Also, previous studies have focused very much on the credit markets
denominated in USD, while in our dataset a majority of 86 contracts were denominated in
EUR against 58 in USD.
24 A potential flaw is that ratings were only considered at the end of the sample period, so rating migration
was not taken into account. However, as only a 2-year period is considered, as ratings are believed to provide
a through-the-cycle assessment of credit risk and as ratings are regrouped in larger buckets (e.g. Baa1, Baa2
and Baa3 are all considered as Baa), it is a likely assumption this should not bias our results.16
3.2. Descriptive statistics
3.2.1. Full dataset
As shown above, the sector and rating of each of the 103 reference entities are known, as
are the currency and term of each of the 144 CDS tickers. For each CDS ticker, a time
series of daily CDS premia and maturity matched par asset swap spreads for the period
January 2004 to December 2005 is available. The difference between the CDS premium
and the maturity matched par asset swap spread is denoted as the basis.
The main characteristics for each separate element of the cross section are given in
appendix 1. This appendix reveals that, for some series, the average basis is very close to
zero (e.g. Usinor: +0.1 bp.), while for others the average basis differs significantly from
zero. The extrema for the averages per series are British American Tobacco (-6.2 bp.) and
the 10-year tenor for the Philippine government (+ 136.7 bp.). As illustrated by the
example of TDC, which was involved in a Leveraged Buy-Out during the period, a close
to zero average basis (in this case only -0.1 bp.) may hide much of the time series
dispersion. The basis for TDC varied from -32.2 bp. to as much as 45.8 bp. during the
period, with a standard deviation of 11.4 bp. The series with the lowest and highest
standard deviation were the 5-year RWE contract and 3-year GMAC contract, with 2.2 bp.
and 66.6 bp., respectively. The 3-year GMAC series also had the highest individual basis
observation within the sample (274 bp. on 11 May 2005), while the lowest basis reading in
our sample (-76 bp. on 9 January 2004) came from Alcatel.
Table 4 - Basis: main characteristics
2004 2005 2004-2005
All Sectors 16,0 16,8 16,3
Corporates only 8,1 11,6 9,9
All Sectors 6,5 8,1 7,5




Table 4 gives key aggregate statistics for the basis. This shows that, for the full period
2004-2005, the arithmetic mean basis of the full dataset was a positive 16.3 bp., hence
reflecting a higher average CDS premium than asset swap spread. However, if we ignore
the 11 emerging market sovereign reference entities in the sample, thus focusing only on
corporate issuers, the mean drops to 9.9 bp. The distribution is characterized by its
skewness, since focusing on the median basis instead of the mean significantly alters the
outcome. The full sample median is 7.5 bp., dropping to 6.5 bp. when only corporations
are considered as reference entities. These results are in line with other studies such as
Blanco et al. (2005), Levin et al. (2005), Norden and Weber (2004) and Zhu (2004), which
reported average bases of 6 bp., -2 bp., 14 bp. and 13 bp., respectively. While Norden and
Weber (2004) report significant divergence in the average basis for the different years in
their sample (2000 to 2002), our dataset seems to be more homogeneous through time, as
averages for 2004 and 2005 are fairly close to each other.17
Chart 1 - The CDS premium, asset swap spread and basis through time
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Chart 1 illustrates the dynamics of the basis through time. For each daily observation both
averages and medians of all CDS premia, asset swap spreads and bases of the cross-
section were plotted. Average CDS premia moved in a range from 55 bp. to 105 bp., and
average asset swap spreads in a range from 40 bp. to 80 bp. Medians for CDS premia and
asset swap spreads moved in ranges from 20 bp. to 50 bp., and 15 bp. to 50 bp.,
respectively. The average basis increased from 5 bp. in the beginning of the time series to
a top of 27 bp. at the end May 2004, and than reverted back to 8 bp. at the end of 2004. A
second cycle was observed in 2005, in which again a peak of 25 bp. was reached in May,
ending the time series back at some 17 bp., a level which is also close to the average for
the full sample. The median basis followed similar patterns, but moved in a narrower
range, from 2 bp. to 12 bp. Chart 1 shows that average and median bases are positive
throughout the period, but that they are also time-varying and exhibit large swings.
Nevertheless, CDS premia and asset swap spreads tend to move broadly in parallel.
Chart 1 implies one other notable conclusion: the average basis tends to be market
directional, so there is a positive correlation between the basis and the level of spreads.25
This means that in periods when credit markets sell off, hence when spreads widen, the
basis tends to increase accordingly. For the sample period as a whole, this is best
illustrated in the months March to June 2005.26 Chart 1 showed how CDS premia, asset
25 See also Fage (2003), who presents anecdotal evidence for emerging market sovereign issuers, and Taksler
et al. (2006) for a more general discussion.
26 At the beginning of March 2005, spreads were reaching record lows as corporate fundamentals were very
solid (low default rates, low balance sheet leverage, strong and increasing profitability, solid liquidity
positions) and technical conditions were supportive (muted supply, strong demand due to the global search
for yield and strong CDO issuance). In mid March 2005 the main US auto manufacturer, General Motors (GM),
then issued a significant profit warning. This sparked speculation among market participants about the
possibility of GM becoming a fallen angel, should the rating agencies downgrade GM’s ratings from
investment-grade to junk in the wake of the deteriorating fundamentals. This fear became reality at the
beginning of May 2005 when Standard and Poor’s did indeed lower GM’s rating to below investment grade.
In the wake of that decision, many hedge funds were then rumoured to have suffered big losses on so-called
correlation trades involving auto sector debt, causing further and more widespread losses in credit markets.
In late May and early June 2005, it became clear that these fears were broadly unfounded and spreads
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swap spreads, and the difference between the two did indeed all increase significantly
from mid-March 2005 to mid-May 2005, to revert back in the subsequent month.
































Chart 2 further illustrates this market directional behaviour of the basis for the entire
sample period by scatter plotting the average basis together with average CDS spread
levels, indicating a strong positive relationship.
Chart 3 - Scatter plot of the average CDS premium and asset swap spread
       L E V E L S         D A I L Y  C H A N G E S
(in basis points)
Chart 3 elaborates further on the observation made earlier that average CDS and asset
swaps tend to move broadly in parallel. The left-hand panel of this chart indicates a
strong positive relationship between the levels of average CDS premia and asset swap
spreads. Linear approximation through regression shows a very high R² of 91%. However,19
both series are suspected not to be stationary, making the regression potentially spurious.
Further on in this paper, formal testing for unit roots will be carried out, followed by
appropriate cointegration analysis. That said, the right-hand panel of chart 2 shows that
there is also a strong positive relationship in first differences: between daily changes in
average CDS premia and daily changes in asset swap spreads, R² equals 58%, further
supporting the case for strongly related credit market segments, as expected.
3.2.2. Basis by subset of the dataset
While the above description was based on the full dataset, some distinguishing features
may also be highlighted for different subsets of the sample. Appendix 2 presents tables
with descriptive statistics by rating, sector, currency and term.
Calculation of the average basis by rating bucket shows a fairly high average basis of 21.6
bp. for Aaa credits, a very high average basis of 74.5 bp. for high-yield entities (rated Ba),
and a much lower average basis for intermediary ratings, with a minimum of 6.6 bp. for
entities rated A. Market participants refer to this phenomenon as the so-called basis smile.
Hjort et al. (2002) argue that the zero-floor for a CDS premium mainly drives the basis
upwards for very high grade credits, while other factors, such as the cheapest-to-deliver
option, mainly affect credits with a low rating. These drivers are reported to have less
impact on the intermediary rated entities, hence keeping their basis lower. In 2004 the
average basis was lower for all rating classes than in 2005, except for Ba-rated entities
which had a lower average basis in 2005.
The government sector, representing emerging market sovereign issuers Ɇ which are
frequently rated below investment-grade Ɇ has a much higher average basis than all
corporate sectors, at 54.2 bp., and its dispersion is also the highest with a standard
deviation of 51.1 bp. The average government basis was higher in 2004 than in 2005,
which is another illustration of the market directional behaviour of the basis, as emerging
market spreads have indeed become tighter in the last year. Some corporate sectors such
as basic materials have a very close-to-zero average basis, while others have seen a
significantly positive basis. One sector to highlight is the financial sector. Given their great
relative importance in terms of number of reference entities and its high average basis of
15.4 bp., financials are the largest single sector making the average basis for the full
corporate dataset as high as it is. Digging into the details shows a much wider average
basis for the financial sector in 2005 than in 2004. This again mainly reflects the market
directional feature of the basis, as auto sector finance companies such as General Motors
Acceptance Company (GMAC) and Ford Motor Credit Company (FMCC) experienced
gyrations in 2005.
In terms of currencies, highly significant differences have been observed. The average
basis for credits denominated in EUR has only amounted to 7.5 bp., while USD contracts
are reported to have an average basis of 29.3 bp. However, this divergence largely reflects
the fact that all emerging market sovereign debt and the vast majority of auto sector
related financial credits have been denominated in USD. A similar explanation can be
given for the much higher than average basis for the 10-year segment of the credit curve
(35.8 bp.), as most of these contracts once again concern emerging market sovereign debt.
While the difference between the average basis for 3-year (16.9 bp.) and 5-year (14.1 bp.)
contracts is less striking, it is nonetheless remarkable that the lowest average basis is
observed in the most liquid part of the CDS curve, i.e. the 5-year segment. This may
illustrate the fact that arbitrage opportunities tend to disappear faster as markets become
more liquid.20
3.3. Methodology
As has been illustrated, aggregate CDS premia and par asset swap spreads tend to move
together in time. However, should these series be non-stationary, this may lead to
spurious regressions in which results from traditional regression analysis might look
good, while the series may be totally unrelated (Brooks (2002)). For interpreting long-term
relationships among non-stationary series, cointegration analysis, as proposed by Engle
and Granger (1987), is the appropriate framework.27
As a first step, the supposed non-stationarity of the CDS and asset swap series is verified.
As argued by Brooks (2002), if a series must be differenced once before it becomes
stationary, it is said to be integrated of order one or to contain one unit root. A stationary
series follows a process which has a constant mean, variance and autocovariance structure
through time. In order to test for a unit root we use the augmented Dickey-Fuller test.28
The test regressions are
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p is the appropriate number of lags to be included, which is determined by the Schwartz
information criterion. The null hypothesis is that the series contains a unit root (D = 0),
versus the alternative hypothesis of a stationary series. The test statistic equals






and critical values, as derived from simulation experiments, are tabulated as they follow a
non-standard distribution (Brooks (2002)). If the test statistic exceeds the critical value for
a given confidence level (10%: -2.57; 5%:-2.87; 1%: -3.44), the null hypothesis of a unit root
cannot be rejected.
In a second step, it is verified whether (non-stationary) CDS and asset swap series are
bound by a cointegration relationship. Formally, Engle and Granger (1987) define a set of
variables as cointegrated if any linear combination of them is stationary. However, in this
specific case, following Zhu (2004), we look for a more restricted form of cointegration as
we "know" by theory exactly which linear combination we expect to be stationary, i.e. the
difference between the two series, the CDS-bond basis. Therefore, one only has to test for
a unit root in the basis series, using a similar augmented Dickey-Fuller test regression.
) 3 (
1
, , 1 , , ¦
 
   '    '
p
i
t n i t n i t n t n u B B B E D
When the test statistic is lower than the critical value at a certain confidence level, the null
hypothesis of a unit root is rejected.  In that case, the basis series is stationary, so the CDS
and asset swap series are said to be cointegrated.
27 Blanco et al. (2005) argue that the time of reversion to equilibrium provides grounds for the use of "long
run" cointegration analysis on data sets that cover only a relatively small time period. We simply subscribe to
their conclusion that it is indeed methodologically appropriate to make use of cointegration techniques.
28 Alternatively, one could run Phillips-Perron tests. However, as argued by Brooks (2002), the two tests tend
to give similar results, which is why we only consider the Dickey-Fuller framework.21
3.4. Results
Appendix 3 includes detailed results of all unit root tests for individual series. Both test
statistics and probabilities (MacKinnon one-sided p-values) are tabulated, and a
concluding assessment is added. In all 144 CDS series and in a very large majority of asset
swap spread series (137 out of 144) we find evidence of a unit root, which confirms the
view that the regular framework of regression analysis is inappropriate and that
cointegration analysis needs to be applied instead.
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Testing for cointegration in the individual basis series gives somewhat mixed results,
which are however in line with other studies. As shown in table 5, we find evidence of
cointegration in 87 cases out of 144. Test statistics diverge as far as from + 0.18 for the 3-
year series of FMCC, indicating 97% certainty of a unit root, to -7.23 for John Deere
Capital Corporation, indicating near 100% certainty of cointegration. It is not surprising to
note that the worst outcome again is auto sector debt related. In the case of the 3-year
FMCC contract, the May 2005 gyrations made both spreads and the basis behave in a very
volatile fashion. On some days, the basis reached levels of almost 200 bp. This presumably
reflects the fact that, in an attempt to hedge exposure or to monetize views on the credit,
many investors primarily chose the CDS market to execute trades.
Furthermore, table 5 shows that we find more evidence of a long-term equilibrium
relationship for credits denominated in USD than those in EUR, which may reflect better
liquidity conditions in USD corporate bond markets. A less intuitive conclusion is that
cointegration seems to occur less in the most liquid part of the CDS curve, being the 5-
year maturity. In terms of ratings and sectors, our results imply that cointegration occurs
less in high-yield than in investment-grade credit markets, and occurs more for corporate
credit than in emerging market sovereign credit markets. An alternative interpretation of
the overall results could be that arbitrage opportunities between CDS and bond markets
tend to last longer in emerging market sovereign markets, in high-yield markets, in
markets denominated in euro and in the 5-year segment of the credit curve.22
3.5. Comparison with other studies
Although credit derivative markets have only emerged over the past decade, a vast
number of authors have shown interest in this increasingly important segment of the
global finance industry. Also, the "niche" of arbitrage opportunities between CDS and
bond markets has already been explored by several academics. In comparing the outcome
of different studies we will only focus on the most pertinent and relevant papers. Other
related, often interesting, papers that have a somewhat different or broader focus, will
therefore not be included from here on.29
In table 7 our paper is compared with five other articles, namely Blanco et al. (2005),
Chan-Lau and Kim (2004), Levin et al. (2005), Norden and Weber (2004) and Zhu (2004).
All the papers but one use cointegration techniques for analyzing long-run relationships,
in some cases complemented by lead-lag analysis of short-term deviations. The exception
that has been included in the table is Levin et al. (2005), whose approach differs
significantly from that of the other papers, but which we consider to be a very relevant
contribution in this domain. Levin et al. (2005) perceive the basis as a reflection of the
existence of market frictions between the two credit market segments, and focus their
analysis on defining proxies for the different basis drivers. Finally, they show that firm-
specific causes of these market frictions are significantly more important than systematic
factors.
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29 Examples include Crouch and March (2005), Houweling and Vorst (2003), Hull et al. (2004), Longstaff et al.
(2003), and Trück et al. (2004).23
In comparison with other papers, it appears that our dataset is fairly rich in terms of both
the number of reference entities and the diversity of the credits included. We consider a
two-year timeframe of daily observations, which is in line with most other articles.
Besides the most common 5-year maturity, we also include the 3-year and 10-year
segment of the credit curve. Our dataset also includes a large amount of credits
denominated in euro, while many authors only consider USD. Finally, both corporate and
emerging market sovereign credits are included in the sample, while most other papers
only consider one market segment.
Our methodology for maturity matching is a combination of direct matching and linear
interpolation, which is also common practice in other articles. Two notable exceptions are
Chan-Lau and Kim (2004), who do not consider maturity matching at all, and Levin et al.
(2005) who make use of the superior richness of their CDS dataset to estimate a full CDS
curve and match the CDS spread to the exact remaining maturity of the bond. We found a
median positive basis of 7.5 bp., which is in line with results from other studies.
Besides Levin et al. (2005), all other papers made use of a cointegration approach to
consider long-run relationships. It should be noted that some authors have worked with
an "unrestricted" definition of cointegration, allowing for any linear combination of CDS
and asset swaps to be stationary. Conversely, Zhu (2004) and ourselves have "restricted"
the examination of the long-run relationship to testing for a unit root in the CDS-bond
basis, as predicted by theory. We focused the analysis on the presence of a long-run
equilibrium relationship between both market segments, while other authors also made
an assessment of short-term lead-lags between CDS and asset swaps. Both Blanco et al.
(2005) and Norden and Weber (2004) have found some mixed evidence of price discovery
in CDS markets, as they tend to lead their cash bond counterparts, while in Chan-Lau and
Kim (2004) and Zhu (2004) this tentative conclusion could not be confirmed.
4. Concluding remarks
We have shown that CDS and bond markets are closely related and bound by a long-run
equilibrium relationship, as CDS premia and par asset swap spreads are mostly
cointegrated. Nevertheless, we found that for the period 2004-2005 the median CDS-bond
basis was positive (7.5 bp). The CDS-bond basis is both firm-specific and time dependent,
and is determined by at least 14 different factors which have been discussed in great detail.
Furthermore, we found that the basis tends to be market directional. Evidence of the basis
smile was found across rating buckets. We showed that the basis for emerging market
sovereign entities is significantly higher than for corporate issuers, and that the basis is
lowest in the 5-year segment of the CDS curve. Finally, we found that the basis for credits
denominated in EUR is significantly lower than for contracts denominated in USD.
Using publicly available information, we have been able to construct a large and reliable
dataset, which has been analyzed for long-run equilibrium relationships. Future research
could logically focus on more detailed analysis of short-term deviations from this
equilibrium, using lead-lag analysis techniques such as Granger causality and vector error
correction models. More detailed analysis of the effective practical exploitability of
apparent arbitrage possibilities, including an assessment of transaction costs, would also
be an interesting path for future research. Finally, constructing a model for the basis level
by using proxies for the different economic basis drivers may yield better insights into the
relative importance of the various factors.24
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Entity Currency Term Rating Sector Average Min. Max. SDN Average Min. Max. SDN Average Min. Max. SDN
ABN Amro Bank NV EUR 5 Aa Financial 6,8 -4,4 14,5 2,9 11,9 7,8 18,0 2,9 5,1 -5,1 20,5 4,5 500
Akzo Nobel NV EUR 5 A Basic Materials -4,4 -16,7 3,4 3,2 30,6 20,0 54,9 7,2 35,1 18,8 68,8 8,9 500
Alcatel SA EUR 3 Ba Communications 9,9 -76,0 79,2 27,0 93,2 32,0 186,4 42,4 83,3 30,7 239,6 48,1 449
Allianz AG EUR 3 Aa Financial 9,5 0,8 15,2 3,0 15,8 10,0 24,5 3,9 6,3 -3,1 22,3 6,2 499
Allianz AG EUR 5 Aa Financial 11,8 0,4 20,0 3,7 23,0 16,4 31,7 3,8 11,2 2,8 30,1 6,4 502
Altria Group Inc USD 3 Baa Consumer, Non-cyclical 32,9 -26,6 73,1 14,1 110,1 39,1 224,3 48,4 77,2 8,9 181,1 46,9 484
American Express Co USD 5 A Financial 16,4 3,3 27,6 5,1 25,3 17,3 32,9 4,1 8,8 -2,7 19,2 4,9 487
Arcelor EUR 3 Baa Basic Materials 0,3 -24,4 17,4 6,7 37,7 17,2 79,5 15,6 37,5 16,1 96,4 19,2 477
Arcelor EUR 5 Baa Basic Materials 0,3 -23,9 18,2 6,4 53,0 31,3 89,2 14,5 52,7 27,0 101,3 16,0 495
Assicurazioni Generali SpA EUR 5 Aa Financial 3,5 -7,1 18,1 6,3 19,6 13,9 27,3 3,5 16,1 1,7 30,6 6,9 499
Banca Intesa SpA EUR 5 A Financial 1,0 -7,7 9,9 4,4 17,5 12,0 31,0 4,2 16,5 5,1 33,9 6,4 501
Bank of America Corp USD 5 Aa Financial 13,3 5,4 22,1 2,9 20,1 12,4 28,0 3,8 6,8 -4,9 16,3 3,6 498
Bayer AG EUR 3 A Basic Materials 0,3 -12,4 7,5 3,8 22,3 12,0 42,5 8,6 22,0 9,2 52,8 10,4 499
Bayer AG EUR 5 A Basic Materials -0,4 -12,1 7,1 3,4 31,9 20,5 55,4 8,6 32,3 19,2 61,1 8,4 500
Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsb EUR 5 A Financial 8,1 -6,9 21,6 4,2 24,5 15,3 38,8 5,3 16,4 0,5 38,8 7,2 501
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG EUR 5 A Consumer, Cyclical 7,4 -2,7 17,8 3,4 25,8 16,8 39,4 6,0 18,4 8,2 32,8 4,9 498
Bear Stearns Cos Inc/The USD 5 A Financial 7,6 -5,2 22,5 4,7 32,6 21,2 45,2 5,9 25,0 12,0 35,1 4,3 501
Bouygues EUR 5 A Industrial -2,0 -13,7 6,9 3,4 29,8 19,7 45,0 5,8 31,9 17,8 52,8 6,7 499
Brazilian Government Interna USD 3 BB Government 60,5 -5,5 159,2 28,7 325,0 131,8 792,2 152,6 264,5 101,3 734,2 132,7 496
Brazilian Government Interna USD 5 BB Government 60,9 -29,5 153,2 34,8 434,6 221,0 902,7 155,6 373,8 151,1 782,7 150,3 495
British American Tobacco PLC EUR 5 Baa Consumer, Non-cyclical -6,2 -20,6 1,2 3,7 57,8 35,0 101,4 13,8 64,1 37,6 103,5 15,2 496
Capital One Bank USD 5 Baa Financial 5,9 -9,9 30,2 8,6 49,1 24,2 76,3 13,7 43,2 23,3 71,5 11,6 496
Carrefour SA EUR 5 A Consumer, Non-cyclical 5,4 -2,3 20,2 3,4 23,6 17,4 36,4 4,2 18,2 8,9 26,9 4,1 500
Casino Guichard Perrachon SA EUR 3 Baa Consumer, Non-cyclical -0,1 -19,9 18,8 6,3 54,9 33,3 96,6 10,1 55,0 30,2 90,9 12,7 501
Casino Guichard Perrachon SA EUR 5 Baa Consumer, Non-cyclical 1,6 -18,6 19,9 7,1 79,3 51,6 141,0 17,8 77,7 47,9 133,6 21,6 502
Cie de Saint-Gobain EUR 5 A Industrial -0,3 -8,8 11,8 3,6 32,4 23,0 52,4 5,6 32,7 19,0 51,4 5,8 497
CIT Group Inc USD 5 A Financial 11,5 -5,1 30,2 5,5 40,7 25,5 58,3 8,3 29,2 14,3 42,4 5,7 488
Citigroup Inc USD 3 Aa Financial 10,3 -2,0 20,1 3,4 12,5 7,5 20,3 3,4 2,2 -7,4 13,0 3,5 500
Citigroup Inc USD 5 Aa Financial 8,0 -8,8 17,8 3,8 19,5 12,0 26,4 3,7 11,5 -1,5 25,2 5,7 502
Colombia Government Internat USD 3 BB Government 99,8 24,1 209,0 44,8 250,2 90,4 524,5 94,0 150,5 38,8 383,3 58,3 490
Colombia Government Internat USD 5 BB Government 116,8 50,4 216,5 39,1 357,7 166,4 642,5 100,4 240,9 102,5 453,0 68,9 490
Comcast Cable Communications USD 5 Baa Communications 15,8 -2,8 35,3 6,7 55,3 25,8 85,8 16,0 39,5 9,8 69,8 12,9 491
Commerzbank AG EUR 5 A Financial 9,9 -0,8 19,7 3,1 21,9 15,1 34,7 5,1 12,0 2,4 28,9 4,6 501
Compagnie Generale des Etabl EUR 5 Baa Consumer, Cyclical -1,8 -20,3 19,6 5,7 41,3 28,9 69,2 8,0 43,1 24,6 71,8 10,0 501
Countrywide Home Loans Inc USD 5 A Financial 15,9 -1,5 30,6 6,8 49,7 34,9 66,4 6,9 33,8 20,1 45,0 4,2 490
DaimlerChrysler AG EUR 3 Baa Consumer, Cyclical 9,8 -2,0 26,7 5,3 54,5 30,7 127,6 16,2 44,7 22,7 116,4 14,2 498
DaimlerChrysler AG EUR 5 Baa Consumer, Cyclical 20,5 8,4 39,5 7,1 79,8 52,0 170,9 17,8 59,3 37,6 142,0 14,3 499
DaimlerChrysler AG USD 5 Baa Consumer, Cyclical -1,4 -48,2 20,5 7,6 80,2 52,0 197,8 19,2 81,6 43,2 195,5 22,5 458
Deere & Co USD 5 A Industrial 12,0 -7,3 23,0 4,6 25,2 19,7 34,6 4,4 13,2 -0,4 28,1 6,1 498
Deutsche Bank AG EUR 5 Aa Financial 9,8 1,1 19,4 3,1 16,7 13,1 21,5 2,1 7,0 -3,3 20,1 4,4 503
Deutsche Telekom AG EUR 3 A Communications 0,9 -12,6 19,8 7,7 29,4 12,8 57,3 9,9 28,5 7,3 64,7 13,3 494
Deutsche Telekom AG EUR 5 A Communications 4,9 -3,5 16,9 4,3 44,0 23,8 74,5 10,2 39,1 23,3 70,6 9,8 499
Deutsche Telekom AG EUR 10 A Communications 7,0 -3,2 18,0 3,9 68,0 43,0 95,9 9,6 61,0 36,0 97,2 10,5 481
Electricite de France EUR 5 Aa Utilities 11,6 -5,3 23,3 6,3 21,9 14,8 32,3 5,0 10,3 -6,8 27,6 8,4 496
Enel SpA EUR 5 Aa Utilities 18,5 7,9 28,2 5,2 22,9 16,1 32,8 5,1 4,4 -5,0 14,6 4,0 497
Energias de Portugal SA EUR 5 Aa Utilities 0,4 -20,4 11,3 4,9 27,3 19,5 42,3 6,1 26,9 12,8 51,8 9,8 497
Fannie Mae USD 5 Aaa Financial 26,2 16,9 34,4 3,3 19,8 9,0 30,1 4,6 -6,4 -15,1 3,0 4,5 480
Fiat SpA EUR 3 Ba Consumer, Cyclical 88,3 -59,2 221,4 63,7 353,7 198,7 629,0 93,9 265,4 165,2 569,2 74,3 493
Fiat SpA EUR 5 Ba Consumer, Cyclical 77,6 -13,5 196,2 47,2 419,3 303,5 711,8 76,9 341,7 238,5 599,7 68,7 499
Ford Motor Credit Co EUR 5 Baa Financial 37,8 -3,0 145,3 26,8 286,2 140,2 673,3 139,8 248,4 106,5 560,6 121,2 495
Ford Motor Credit Co USD 3 Baa Financial 26,0 -49,1 188,6 39,2 216,4 88,3 628,2 130,7 190,4 88,6 539,9 101,7 466
Ford Motor Credit Co USD 5 Baa Financial 45,3 -11,4 172,9 34,5 283,4 138,5 651,0 137,9 238,1 130,4 505,6 109,0 499
Fortis Bank SA/NV EUR 5 A Financial 11,6 3,4 28,5 3,8 20,8 13,3 34,7 2,6 9,2 -0,8 16,2 3,3 495
Fortum Power & Heat AB EUR 5 A Utilities -0,4 -27,7 14,6 7,3 30,5 19,0 44,3 6,3 30,9 9,7 56,7 10,7 494
France Telecom SA EUR 3 A Communications 9,6 -1,2 23,6 3,9 32,1 13,7 59,7 10,3 22,5 11,5 47,6 7,8 495
France Telecom SA EUR 5 A Communications 8,8 -9,2 23,1 5,4 47,8 26,0 75,6 10,2 39,0 20,8 84,9 12,7 496
France Telecom SA EUR 10 A Communications -4,0 -26,7 19,9 6,7 74,9 46,9 100,3 8,7 78,9 45,2 111,3 11,4 467
Freddie Mac USD 5 Aaa Financial 28,7 19,5 44,0 4,3 17,5 7,2 30,0 5,9 -11,2 -27,5 2,8 6,8 482
General Electric Co USD 5 Aaa Industrial 18,2 2,7 31,2 4,6 26,7 18,0 42,1 4,6 8,5 -0,3 19,2 4,2 498
General Motors Acceptance Co EUR 5 Ba Financial 34,3 -8,5 115,9 20,7 303,2 110,5 764,8 162,5 268,8 102,9 649,0 152,6 494
General Motors Acceptance Co USD 3 Ba Financial 65,2 -21,5 274,2 66,6 247,4 78,8 681,6 160,2 182,2 79,0 496,2 104,2 470
General Motors Acceptance Co USD 5 Ba Financial 62,2 -10,3 254,0 56,5 302,9 110,8 754,6 162,4 240,7 115,1 501,2 111,4 500
GlaxoSmithKline PLC EUR 5 Aa Consumer, Non-cyclical 14,0 0,6 23,4 4,1 13,1 8,5 28,9 3,2 -1,0 -12,2 18,1 6,0 496
Goldman Sachs Group Inc USD 3 Aa Financial 11,6 -0,9 27,1 5,6 20,0 12,3 29,5 5,2 8,3 -4,5 20,0 4,6 496
Goldman Sachs Group Inc USD 5 Aa Financial 3,2 -6,0 16,5 3,7 30,9 20,5 42,3 5,1 27,7 13,1 41,1 6,4 502
Groupe Danone EUR 3 A Consumer, Non-cyclical 3,8 -9,6 15,2 3,9 14,0 7,1 24,3 5,7 10,2 2,0 21,1 3,8 497
HBOS PLC EUR 5 Aa Financial 7,5 -3,7 17,1 4,0 12,7 9,8 17,6 2,1 5,2 -5,5 16,9 5,4 486
Honeywell International Inc USD 5 A Industrial 6,6 -22,1 22,3 6,7 23,7 15,4 44,3 7,3 17,1 0,0 47,5 10,9 499
Iberdrola SA EUR 5 A Utilities 4,1 -8,7 10,6 2,5 24,2 18,2 33,2 3,7 20,1 11,7 33,4 4,2 498
ING Bank NV EUR 5 Aa Financial 5,9 -1,8 14,0 2,9 11,9 7,8 20,3 3,3 6,0 -4,5 19,2 4,7 500
International Lease Finance USD 5 A Financial -0,1 -14,7 18,4 6,5 39,0 25,1 57,4 6,9 39,2 23,6 58,3 7,3 487
John Deere Capital Corp USD 5 A Financial 15,1 -0,6 33,7 4,3 28,2 21,5 46,3 4,6 13,2 -0,4 26,8 6,1 466
JPMorgan Chase & Co USD 5 A Financial 21,4 -2,6 31,8 5,4 29,1 20,0 41,4 4,8 7,7 -4,7 23,6 6,2 499
Koninklijke Ahold NV EUR 5 Ba Consumer, Non-cyclical 10,9 -15,4 43,6 13,5 166,2 79,6 285,2 53,6 155,3 81,6 277,1 53,2 498
Koninklijke Philips Electron EUR 5 Baa Industrial -0,8 -17,8 8,4 3,8 37,2 30,6 54,7 4,9 38,0 23,9 64,4 7,3 499
Korea Development Bank USD 5 A Financial 1,9 -15,4 22,3 7,2 41,8 23,5 75,9 13,0 39,9 16,4 68,0 13,0 497
Kraft Foods Inc USD 5 Baa Consumer, Non-cyclical 6,8 -6,9 21,3 4,9 31,6 20,7 54,3 7,1 24,8 8,5 41,6 7,0 493
Lafarge SA EUR 3 Baa Industrial 4,4 -6,9 13,9 4,0 31,1 19,2 64,9 9,2 26,8 13,9 65,2 11,2 462
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc USD 5 A Financial 8,4 -3,9 23,0 4,4 32,7 24,1 43,2 5,3 24,3 9,4 37,0 5,7 499
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vui EUR 5 Baa Diversified -0,1 -17,5 9,7 3,6 37,6 28,8 58,5 7,3 37,7 25,2 63,1 7,2 500
Malaysia Government Internat USD 5 A Government 4,9 -15,6 26,8 8,5 33,8 21,4 67,2 8,8 29,0 0,5 60,8 14,3 500
MBNA America Bank NA USD 5 Baa Financial 7,9 -10,6 31,8 7,2 34,6 10,0 57,8 14,1 26,7 3,5 46,0 11,8 455
Merrill Lynch & Co Inc USD 3 Aa Financial 12,3 0,9 34,6 5,2 19,4 11,5 33,5 5,4 7,1 -4,3 23,6 3,9 489
Merrill Lynch & Co Inc USD 5 Aa Financial 10,1 1,0 21,9 3,4 30,6 21,0 40,9 4,8 20,5 8,7 31,8 5,2 500
Metro AG EUR 3 Baa Consumer, Non-cyclical -2,2 -20,2 10,4 4,6 34,9 20,6 67,9 10,7 37,1 18,1 86,5 13,8 494
Metro AG EUR 5 Baa Consumer, Non-cyclical 2,5 -13,1 11,7 3,6 49,6 38,0 78,3 8,2 47,1 32,1 86,5 9,6 495
Mexico Government Internatio USD 3 Baa Government 27,0 -1,8 63,7 11,4 65,2 36,3 139,5 18,0 38,2 6,3 81,2 18,0 495
Mexico Government Internatio USD 5 Baa Government 21,6 -6,4 52,4 11,7 100,1 58,3 200,6 25,4 78,4 19,7 176,9 27,5 495
Morgan Stanley USD 3 Aa Financial 1,4 -15,7 19,4 6,1 19,3 11,8 30,0 5,2 17,9 6,1 32,2 4,9 494
MTR Corp USD 5 Aa Industrial -2,8 -18,0 12,4 5,9 19,8 10,3 39,3 7,3 22,6 0,9 47,7 11,4 473
National Grid PLC EUR 5 Baa Utilities -1,9 -12,0 7,9 3,8 31,1 22,1 47,9 7,9 32,9 17,0 57,5 9,7 498
Peru Government Internationa USD 3 Ba Government 76,6 17,3 194,6 34,5 187,7 81,1 439,5 84,9 111,1 28,2 342,1 62,0 489
Peru Government Internationa USD 5 Ba Government 108,0 47,4 259,6 48,2 277,0 127,4 605,8 111,4 169,0 52,7 402,3 70,4 489
Peugeot SA EUR 3 A Consumer, Cyclical 3,3 -4,9 23,1 4,9 22,4 10,4 46,7 8,2 19,1 7,0 32,7 4,7 499
Peugeot SA EUR 5 A Consumer, Cyclical 5,0 -4,5 22,0 4,9 33,1 20,2 59,8 8,8 28,2 16,0 44,3 5,5 500
Philippine Government Intern USD 5 Ba Government 114,2 51,9 216,5 31,4 429,3 269,0 537,0 66,8 315,1 158,6 415,5 50,7 501
Philippine Government Intern USD 10 Ba Government 136,7 70,6 229,1 31,5 504,6 354,5 610,0 57,2 368,0 247,8 444,2 40,4 436
Poland Government Internatio USD 10 A Government 8,8 -5,2 25,1 6,4 31,8 17,4 63,3 11,6 23,0 0,8 57,0 13,2 491
Portugal Telecom SGPS SA EUR 5 A Communications 3,2 -11,6 14,0 4,2 31,8 17,2 49,4 8,4 28,6 13,2 45,7 7,7 502
PPR SA EUR 5 Baa Consumer, Cyclical 5,5 -6,8 25,4 7,0 96,5 56,9 182,0 34,5 91,0 51,2 165,8 29,3 495
Rabobank Nederland EUR 5 Aaa Financial 13,7 -4,7 42,6 8,6 8,2 6,8 10,3 0,6 -5,6 -34,5 12,5 8,5 498
Renault SA EUR 3 Baa Consumer, Cyclical 2,6 -6,9 12,4 3,2 28,1 17,0 48,2 6,9 25,6 13,4 44,3 7,3 498
Renault SA EUR 5 Baa Consumer, Cyclical 0,8 -11,3 12,6 4,2 40,8 30,0 62,3 6,9 40,0 22,5 63,6 9,3 500
Repsol YPF SA EUR 3 Baa Energy 1,5 -11,0 14,1 4,3 27,5 15,5 51,5 9,0 26,0 12,9 44,0 7,1 499
Republic of Chile USD 3 A Government 0,7 -25,2 19,8 8,0 20,2 11,3 38,5 6,2 19,5 -0,7 53,7 11,8 469
Republic of Chile USD 5 A Government 7,5 -10,8 27,7 7,4 31,5 16,5 61,9 12,2 23,9 1,8 52,4 10,8 468
Republic of Korea USD 3 A Government 20,0 -29,7 71,5 21,6 29,4 14,0 57,2 9,8 9,4 -52,2 69,3 30,0 500
Republic of Korea USD 10 A Government 19,2 -12,1 66,7 19,8 56,2 35,0 95,2 13,6 37,0 1,6 57,5 8,8 441
Republic of Turkey USD 3 Ba Government 45,8 -13,6 125,0 22,3 243,9 89,1 612,5 106,5 198,1 64,4 500,2 95,3 496
Republic of Turkey USD 5 Ba Government 65,9 15,1 126,8 22,7 319,4 152,8 687,5 109,2 253,5 98,1 562,4 97,8 496
Republic of Turkey USD 10 Ba Government 111,5 50,7 279,1 40,0 378,1 221,8 722,3 102,8 266,6 155,5 468,7 68,1 481
Rolls-Royce Group PLC EUR 3 Baa Industrial 3,2 -11,8 16,9 4,2 30,0 12,5 69,8 12,1 26,7 11,0 67,2 12,2 498
Royal KPN NV EUR 5 Baa Communications 4,7 -6,8 25,2 6,5 44,5 27,7 86,3 10,7 39,8 25,4 83,7 9,0 502
RWE AG EUR 3 A Utilities 3,8 -8,2 11,3 2,5 15,0 8,7 33,2 5,5 11,2 0,5 35,9 5,9 497
RWE AG EUR 5 A Utilities 5,1 -5,2 11,8 2,2 22,4 16,6 40,5 5,1 17,3 7,1 41,7 5,7 498
Siemens AG EUR 3 Aa Industrial 4,8 -6,5 17,1 4,2 13,9 7,8 24,5 4,2 9,2 -4,7 23,2 5,6 498
South Africa Government Inte USD 5 Baa Government 6,5 -18,8 29,4 6,6 79,2 40,8 164,3 28,4 72,6 30,4 151,1 27,7 495
South Africa Government Inte USD 10 Baa Government 26,1 -4,9 60,9 12,8 118,3 68,4 223,0 38,1 92,3 44,3 163,4 29,1 454
Suez SA EUR 3 A Utilities 5,1 -7,1 17,8 4,0 24,0 12,0 47,5 9,2 18,9 6,6 42,6 7,7 498
Suez SA EUR 5 A Utilities 4,3 -11,3 15,5 3,9 34,8 21,6 58,8 9,4 30,5 15,6 57,5 10,1 498
TDC A/S EUR 5 Baa Communications -0,1 -32,2 45,8 11,4 90,9 28,3 328,3 81,8 91,0 27,1 302,5 72,7 496
Telecom Italia SpA EUR 3 Baa Communications 3,9 -11,4 19,7 5,9 40,5 19,0 80,3 11,7 36,6 16,2 86,4 12,7 498
Telecom Italia SpA EUR 5 Baa Communications 6,5 -6,0 18,7 4,6 57,3 34,0 98,6 10,5 50,8 33,0 95,4 10,5 501
Telecom Italia SpA EUR 10 Baa Communications 8,3 -8,2 20,0 5,1 84,5 55,0 123,3 9,6 76,2 49,8 112,7 9,5 471
Telefonica SA EUR 3 A Communications 7,9 -3,1 24,2 5,6 25,4 12,5 43,0 8,0 17,4 8,2 33,2 4,8 499
Telefonica SA EUR 5 A Communications 13,1 -3,5 25,9 4,7 38,3 23,5 57,9 8,2 25,3 14,4 44,3 5,1 498
Tesco PLC EUR 5 A Consumer, Non-cyclical 2,3 -10,2 16,7 4,3 19,7 16,2 24,9 2,1 17,4 6,0 27,0 3,7 501
ThyssenKrupp AG EUR 5 Baa Basic Materials 3,1 -12,5 22,7 6,7 87,2 43,1 146,3 26,9 84,1 33,9 156,6 26,4 497
Total SA EUR 3 Aa Energy 7,5 -1,8 16,1 2,8 8,0 6,0 10,8 1,0 0,5 -7,2 8,3 2,3 498
Total SA EUR 5 Aa Energy 6,9 -1,7 15,0 3,1 10,5 8,4 13,4 1,3 3,6 -5,2 12,0 3,5 499
Unilever NV EUR 3 A Consumer, Non-cyclical 4,4 -3,6 14,1 3,0 12,8 5,8 26,0 5,2 8,4 -3,7 19,8 4,1 495
Usinor SA EUR 5 Baa Basic Materials 0,1 -23,9 16,1 6,4 53,0 31,3 89,2 14,6 52,8 27,0 101,3 16,2 477
Vattenfall AB EUR 3 A Utilities 2,0 -9,9 9,8 2,9 18,9 11,2 32,3 5,4 16,9 4,1 31,1 6,4 496
Vattenfall AB EUR 5 A Utilities 3,4 -14,2 17,1 5,1 27,8 19,0 42,0 6,0 24,4 2,1 42,3 9,3 497
Veolia Environnement EUR 5 Baa Utilities 5,6 -12,6 21,2 5,2 37,3 23,8 63,5 9,4 31,8 11,6 64,0 10,4 498
Vodafone Group PLC EUR 3 A Communications 4,6 -8,3 16,5 4,2 20,3 10,3 37,7 7,3 15,7 3,6 42,5 8,4 498
Vodafone Group PLC EUR 5 A Communications 6,5 -5,8 17,9 4,1 30,4 19,2 48,6 6,8 23,9 11,9 47,4 7,0 499
Vodafone Group PLC EUR 10 A Communications 15,5 -7,5 27,5 4,8 48,4 34,7 64,3 6,3 32,9 17,2 55,2 7,0 484
Volkswagen AG EUR 3 A Consumer, Cyclical 9,8 2,1 21,2 4,1 41,9 24,5 70,4 10,5 32,1 14,0 52,3 9,4 495
Volkswagen AG EUR 5 A Consumer, Cyclical 13,6 0,6 27,0 4,2 59,6 42,9 93,2 9,8 46,0 27,9 79,9 8,6 498
Wal-Mart Stores Inc USD 5 Aa Consumer, Cyclical 8,7 -2,5 16,7 4,0 14,7 8,7 19,0 2,5 6,0 -5,9 21,1 5,3 483
Walt Disney Co USD 3 Baa Communications 5,2 -15,1 30,3 7,6 25,1 11,4 58,3 11,6 19,9 2,7 39,3 9,9 486
Washington Mutual Inc USD 5 A Financial 15,1 -0,5 39,3 7,4 42,2 27,9 60,7 5,9 27,2 11,3 42,7 6,3 486
Wells Fargo & Co USD 5 Aa Financial 13,5 1,9 25,2 4,1 18,3 10,2 27,5 4,5 4,8 -8,0 15,9 4,2 481
Basis (in bp.) CDS premium (in bp.) pm: Number of
observations
Asset swap spread (in bp.)






EUR 7,5 -76,0 221,4 17,4 42.607
USD 29,3 -49,1 279,1 40,4 28.240
EUR 6,8 -76,0 221,4 19,3 20.692
USD 29,0 -49,1 279,1 44,9 13.668
EUR 8,2 -59,2 203,1 15,3 21.915









Aaa 21,6 -4,7 44,0 8,2 1.958
Aa 8,7 -18,0 34,6 6,2 11.891
A 6,6 -29,7 71,5 8,6 28.127
Baa 8,1 -49,1 188,6 16,3 20.109
Ba 74,5 -76,0 279,1 52,8 8.762
Aaa 19,2 -4,7 34,4 9,2 948
Aa 7,8 -18,0 34,6 7,0 5.772
A 5,4 -29,7 66,7 9,0 13.602
Baa 6,0 -49,1 73,1 13,0 9.785
Ba 80,8 -76,0 279,1 60,2 4.253
Aaa 23,9 7,4 44,0 6,4 1.010
Aa 9,5 -14,9 24,4 5,3 6.119
A 7,7 -26,7 71,5 8,0 14.525
Baa 10,1 -48,2 188,6 18,7 10.324









Basic Materials -0,1 -24,4 22,7 5,8 3.445
Consumer, Cyclical 16,7 -59,2 221,4 34,0 7.414
Consumer, Non-cyclical 5,8 -26,6 73,1 11,5 6.452
Communications 6,6 -76,0 79,2 9,4 9.806
Diversified -0,1 -17,5 9,7 3,6 500
Energy 5,3 -11,0 16,1 4,4 1.496
Financial 15,4 -49,1 274,2 22,6 20.184
Industrial 4,4 -22,1 31,2 7,8 4.921
Utilities 4,7 -27,7 28,2 6,8 6.462
Government 54,2 -29,7 279,1 51,1 10.167
Basic Materials -2,4 -24,4 18,4 6,3 1.682
Consumer, Cyclical 19,1 -37,9 221,4 38,6 3.611
Consumer, Non-cyclical 5,4 -26,6 73,1 11,7 3.139
Communications 6,2 -76,0 79,2 11,5 4.749
Diversified -0,4 -17,5 8,5 3,8 243
Energy 5,0 -11,0 16,1 4,9 727
Financial 11,0 -49,1 58,6 10,7 9.853
Industrial 2,6 -22,1 31,2 8,4 2.371
Utilities 3,3 -27,7 28,2 7,9 3.140
Government 61,6 -29,7 279,1 61,7 4.845
Basic Materials 2,0 -9,3 22,7 4,3 1.763
Consumer, Cyclical 14,4 -59,2 203,1 28,8 3.803
Consumer, Non-cyclical 6,2 -16,8 62,5 11,2 3.313
Communications 7,0 -32,2 45,8 7,0 5.057
Diversified 0,1 -7,3 9,7 3,5 257
Energy 5,6 -4,3 15,0 3,8 769
Financial 19,6 -21,5 274,2 29,2 10.331
Industrial 6,0 -10,9 23,9 6,8 2.550
Utilities 6,1 -4,6 24,4 5,2 3.322









3 16,9 -76,0 274,2 32,1 20.144
5 14,1 -48,2 259,6 26,8 46.497
10 35,8 -26,7 279,1 51,0 4.206
3 16,9 -76,0 221,4 34,6 9.807
5 13,0 -29,5 259,6 29,4 22.607
10 40,9 -17,9 279,1 58,1 1.946
3 16,9 -59,2 274,2 29,6 10.337
5 15,2 -48,2 254,0 24,0 23.890










Appendix 3 - Individual cointegration analysis and unit root testing
Entity Currency Term test statistic p-value conclusion test statistic p-value conclusion test statistic p-value conclusion
ABN Amro Bank NV EUR 5 -1,79 0,38 Not cointegrated -0,64 0,86 Unit root*** -0,72 0,84 Unit root***
Koninklijke Ahold NV EUR 5 -2,05 0,27 Not cointegrated -1,56 0,50 Unit root*** -1,43 0,57 Unit root***
Akzo Nobel NV EUR 5 -4,09 0,00 Cointegrated*** -0,09 0,95 Unit root*** -1,16 0,69 Unit root***
Alcatel SA EUR 3 -2,81 0,06 Cointegrated* -2,22 0,20 Unit root*** 2,61 0,09 Unit root***
Allianz AG EUR 3 -2,42 0,14 Not cointegrated -1,16 0,69 Unit root*** -1,40 0,58 Unit root***
Allianz AG EUR 5 -2,06 0,26 Not cointegrated -1,51 0,53 Unit root*** -1,25 0,65 Unit root***
Assicurazioni Generali SpA EUR 5 -1,51 0,53 Not cointegrated -1,09 0,72 Unit root*** -1,63 0,47 Unit root***
American Express Co USD 5 -2,97 0,04 Cointegrated** -1,44 0,56 Unit root*** -2,68 0,08 Unit root**
Bank of America Corp USD 5 -4,31 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,21 0,67 Unit root*** -3,10 0,03 Unit root*
British American Tobacco PLC EUR 5 -3,69 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,26 0,65 Unit root*** -1,32 0,62 Unit root***
Bayer AG EUR 3 -1,88 0,34 Not cointegrated -1,18 0,69 Unit root*** -1,14 0,70 Unit root***
Bayer AG EUR 5 -2,91 0,05 Cointegrated** -1,30 0,64 Unit root*** -1,55 0,51 Unit root***
Banca Intesa SpA EUR 5 -0,89 0,79 Not cointegrated -1,00 0,75 Unit root*** 0,01 0,96 Unit root***
Fortum Power & Heat AB EUR 5 -2,75 0,07 Cointegrated* -1,97 0,30 Unit root*** -1,23 0,66 Unit root***
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG EUR 5 -2,31 0,17 Not cointegrated -0,62 0,86 Unit root*** -1,27 0,64 Unit root***
Bouygues EUR 5 -2,53 0,11 Not cointegrated -0,81 0,81 Unit root*** -1,88 0,34 Unit root***
Brazilian Government Interna USD 3 -3,51 0,01 Cointegrated*** -0,75 0,83 Unit root*** -1,33 0,62 Unit root***
Brazilian Government Interna USD 5 -2,00 0,29 Not cointegrated -0,71 0,84 Unit root*** -0,72 0,84 Unit root***
Bear Stearns Cos Inc/The USD 5 -3,31 0,01 Cointegrated** -1,16 0,69 Unit root*** -3,05 0,03 Unit root*
Groupe Danone EUR 3 -1,51 0,53 Not cointegrated -0,65 0,86 Unit root*** -1,24 0,66 Unit root***
Carrefour SA EUR 5 -2,49 0,12 Not cointegrated -1,46 0,55 Unit root*** -2,90 0,05 Unit root*
Casino Guichard Perrachon SA EUR 3 -3,00 0,04 Cointegrated** -2,91 0,05 Unit root* -1,74 0,41 Unit root***
Casino Guichard Perrachon SA EUR 5 -2,68 0,08 Cointegrated* -2,20 0,21 Unit root*** -1,23 0,66 Unit root***
Comcast Cable Communications USD 5 -4,29 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,25 0,65 Unit root*** -1,12 0,71 Unit root***
Countrywide Home Loans Inc USD 5 -2,48 0,12 Not cointegrated -2,29 0,18 Unit root*** -3,53 0,01 Stationary
Citigroup Inc USD 3 -3,92 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,25 0,65 Unit root*** -3,28 0,02 Unit root*
Citigroup Inc USD 5 -4,86 0,00 Cointegrated*** -0,91 0,78 Unit root*** -2,61 0,09 Unit root**
Republic of Chile USD 3 -3,33 0,01 Cointegrated** -2,89 0,05 Unit root* -1,89 0,34 Unit root***
Republic of Chile USD 5 -3,67 0,00 Cointegrated*** -2,65 0,08 Unit root** -1,11 0,71 Unit root***
CIT Group Inc USD 5 -3,51 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,49 0,54 Unit root*** -2,85 0,05 Unit root**
Commerzbank AG EUR 5 -2,45 0,13 Not cointegrated -0,86 0,80 Unit root*** -0,93 0,78 Unit root***
Capital One Bank USD 5 -2,56 0,10 Not cointegrated -1,33 0,62 Unit root*** -2,10 0,24 Unit root***
Colombia Government Internat USD 3 -1,34 0,61 Not cointegrated -0,84 0,81 Unit root*** -2,07 0,26 Unit root***
Colombia Government Internat USD 5 -1,79 0,38 Not cointegrated -0,93 0,78 Unit root*** -0,94 0,78 Unit root***
Deutsche Bank AG EUR 5 -0,93 0,78 Not cointegrated -1,76 0,40 Unit root*** -0,42 0,90 Unit root***
DaimlerChrysler AG EUR 3 -3,34 0,01 Cointegrated** -2,46 0,13 Unit root*** -2,15 0,22 Unit root***
DaimlerChrysler AG EUR 5 -2,74 0,07 Cointegrated* -2,52 0,11 Unit root*** -3,06 0,03 Unit root*
DaimlerChrysler AG USD 5 -4,26 0,00 Cointegrated*** -2,02 0,28 Unit root*** -2,19 0,21 Unit root***
Deere & Co USD 5 -4,45 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,45 0,56 Unit root*** -2,90 0,05 Unit root*
John Deere Capital Corp USD 5 -7,23 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,86 0,35 Unit root*** -2,77 0,06 Unit root**
Walt Disney Co USD 3 -2,14 0,23 Not cointegrated -1,54 0,51 Unit root*** -1,73 0,41 Unit root***
Deutsche Telekom AG EUR 10 -3,74 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,98 0,29 Unit root*** -2,10 0,24 Unit root***
Deutsche Telekom AG EUR 3 -1,86 0,35 Not cointegrated -1,22 0,67 Unit root*** -0,86 0,80 Unit root***
Deutsche Telekom AG EUR 5 -2,19 0,21 Not cointegrated -1,68 0,44 Unit root*** -1,66 0,45 Unit root***
Electricite de France EUR 5 -1,44 0,56 Not cointegrated -0,68 0,85 Unit root*** -0,37 0,91 Unit root***
Enel SpA EUR 5 -0,73 0,84 Not cointegrated -0,93 0,78 Unit root*** -1,58 0,49 Unit root***
Energias de Portugal SA EUR 5 -2,12 0,24 Not cointegrated -1,13 0,71 Unit root*** -0,72 0,84 Unit root***
Freddie Mac USD 5 -2,82 0,06 Cointegrated* -0,02 0,96 Unit root*** -2,18 0,22 Unit root***
Fiat SpA EUR 3 -2,80 0,06 Cointegrated* -2,24 0,19 Unit root*** -1,60 0,48 Unit root***
Fiat SpA EUR 5 -2,23 0,20 Not cointegrated -2,09 0,25 Unit root*** -1,27 0,65 Unit root***
Ford Motor Credit Co EUR 5 -1,74 0,41 Not cointegrated -0,94 0,77 Unit root*** -0,73 0,84 Unit root***
Ford Motor Credit Co USD 3 0,18 0,97 Not cointegrated 1,84 1,00 Unit root*** -0,17 0,94 Unit root***
Ford Motor Credit Co USD 5 -1,34 0,61 Not cointegrated -0,59 0,87 Unit root*** -0,36 0,91 Unit root***
Fannie Mae USD 5 -3,91 0,00 Cointegrated*** -0,54 0,88 Unit root*** -1,95 0,31 Unit root***
Fortis Bank SA/NV EUR 5 -3,06 0,03 Cointegrated** -3,32 0,01 Unit root* -0,52 0,88 Unit root***
France Telecom SA EUR 10 -4,25 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,87 0,35 Unit root*** -3,09 0,03 Unit root*
France Telecom SA EUR 3 -3,76 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,91 0,33 Unit root*** -2,05 0,27 Unit root***
France Telecom SA EUR 5 -1,56 0,50 Not cointegrated -1,75 0,41 Unit root*** -1,53 0,52 Unit root***
General Electric Co USD 5 -4,24 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,65 0,46 Unit root*** -3,06 0,03 Unit root*
General Motors Acceptance Co EUR 5 -3,10 0,03 Cointegrated** -1,62 0,47 Unit root*** -1,42 0,57 Unit root***
General Motors Acceptance Co USD 3 -2,14 0,23 Not cointegrated -1,51 0,53 Unit root*** -1,31 0,62 Unit root***
General Motors Acceptance Co USD 5 -1,91 0,33 Not cointegrated -1,43 0,57 Unit root*** -1,46 0,55 Unit root***
Cie de Saint-Gobain EUR 5 -2,17 0,22 Not cointegrated -1,22 0,67 Unit root*** -2,12 0,24 Unit root***
Goldman Sachs Group Inc USD 3 -2,91 0,04 Cointegrated** -1,51 0,53 Unit root*** -3,58 0,01 Stationary
Goldman Sachs Group Inc USD 5 -4,91 0,00 Cointegrated*** -2,16 0,22 Unit root*** -2,90 0,05 Unit root*
GlaxoSmithKline PLC EUR 5 -2,20 0,21 Not cointegrated -1,60 0,48 Unit root*** -1,79 0,39 Unit root***
HBOS PLC EUR 5 -2,03 0,28 Not cointegrated -1,75 0,41 Unit root*** -1,94 0,31 Unit root***
Honeywell International Inc USD 5 -4,17 0,00 Cointegrated*** -0,84 0,81 Unit root*** -2,39 0,15 Unit root***
Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsb EUR 5 -3,19 0,02 Cointegrated** -0,67 0,85 Unit root*** -0,76 0,83 Unit root***
Iberdrola SA EUR 5 -4,49 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,39 0,59 Unit root*** -2,20 0,21 Unit root***
International Lease Finance USD 5 -3,37 0,01 Cointegrated** -1,52 0,47 Unit root*** -2,34 0,16 Unit root***
ING Bank NV EUR 5 -2,70 0,07 Cointegrated* -0,98 0,76 Unit root*** -1,77 0,40 Unit root***
JPMorgan Chase & Co USD 5 -4,53 0,00 Cointegrated*** -2,03 0,27 Unit root*** -2,31 0,17 Unit root***
Korea Development Bank USD 5 -3,19 0,02 Cointegrated** -1,00 0,75 Unit root*** -1,41 0,58 Unit root***
Kraft Foods Inc USD 5 -3,19 0,02 Cointegrated** -1,19 0,68 Unit root*** -2,92 0,04 Unit root*
Royal KPN NV EUR 5 -1,92 0,32 Not cointegrated 0,79 0,99 Unit root*** 1,81 1,00 Unit root***
Republic of Korea USD 10 -1,75 0,40 Not cointegrated -1,17 0,69 Unit root*** -3,92 0,00 Stationary
Republic of Korea USD 3 -1,24 0,66 Not cointegrated -1,32 0,62 Unit root*** -0,75 0,83 Unit root***
Lafarge SA EUR 3 -3,02 0,03 Cointegrated** -0,96 0,77 Unit root*** -0,52 0,88 Unit root***
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc USD 5 -3,77 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,31 0,63 Unit root*** -2,07 0,26 Unit root***
Arcelor EUR 3 -3,52 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,42 0,57 Unit root*** -1,77 0,39 Unit root***
Arcelor EUR 5 -2,61 0,09 Cointegrated* -1,59 0,49 Unit root*** -1,93 0,32 Unit root***
Suez SA EUR 3 -3,23 0,02 Cointegrated** -0,40 0,91 Unit root*** -1,99 0,29 Unit root***
Suez SA EUR 5 -4,05 0,00 Cointegrated*** -0,24 0,93 Unit root*** -1,74 0,41 Unit root***
MBNA America Bank NA USD 5 -2,89 0,05 Cointegrated** -0,46 0,89 Unit root*** -1,30 0,63 Unit root***
Merrill Lynch & Co Inc USD 3 -2,87 0,05 Cointegrated** -2,32 0,17 Unit root*** -2,90 0,05 Unit root*
Merrill Lynch & Co Inc USD 5 -4,98 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,46 0,55 Unit root*** -2,58 0,10 Unit root**
Mexico Government Internatio USD 3 -3,64 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,41 0,58 Unit root*** -2,61 0,09 Unit root**
Mexico Government Internatio USD 5 -3,23 0,02 Cointegrated** -1,67 0,44 Unit root*** -1,43 0,57 Unit root***
Compagnie Generale des Etabl EUR 5 -2,50 0,12 Not cointegrated -2,47 0,12 Unit root*** -2,02 0,28 Unit root***
Malaysia Government Internat USD 5 -2,50 0,12 Not cointegrated -1,29 0,64 Unit root*** -1,31 0,63 Unit root***
Altria Group Inc USD 3 -3,17 0,02 Cointegrated** -0,84 0,81 Unit root*** -1,12 0,71 Unit root***
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vui EUR 5 -3,49 0,01 Cointegrated*** -0,61 0,87 Unit root*** -1,88 0,34 Unit root***
MTR Corp USD 5 -4,33 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,04 0,74 Unit root*** -2,00 0,29 Unit root***
Metro AG EUR 3 -2,91 0,05 Cointegrated** -1,45 0,56 Unit root*** -0,39 0,91 Unit root***
Metro AG EUR 5 -4,13 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,75 0,41 Unit root*** -0,76 0,83 Unit root***
Morgan Stanley USD 3 -4,78 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,68 0,44 Unit root*** -4,95 0,00 Stationary
National Grid PLC EUR 5 -3,23 0,02 Cointegrated** -1,20 0,68 Unit root*** -1,21 0,67 Unit root***
Peru Government Internationa USD 3 -2,35 0,16 Not cointegrated -0,45 0,90 Unit root*** -2,04 0,27 Unit root***
Peru Government Internationa USD 5 -0,96 0,77 Not cointegrated -0,54 0,88 Unit root*** -1,70 0,43 Unit root***
Peugeot SA EUR 3 -2,72 0,07 Cointegrated* -1,88 0,34 Unit root*** -1,62 0,47 Unit root***
Peugeot SA EUR 5 -2,34 0,16 Not cointegrated -1,70 0,43 Unit root*** -1,92 0,32 Unit root***
Koninklijke Philips Electron EUR 5 -3,93 0,00 Cointegrated*** -0,65 0,86 Unit root*** -1,23 0,66 Unit root***
Philippine Government Intern USD 10 -1,82 0,37 Not cointegrated -0,71 0,84 Unit root*** -1,09 0,72 Unit root***
Philippine Government Intern USD 5 -2,06 0,26 Not cointegrated -0,09 0,95 Unit root*** -0,57 0,87 Unit root***
Poland Government Internatio USD 10 -2,77 0,06 Cointegrated* -2,05 0,27 Unit root*** -0,78 0,82 Unit root***
Portugal Telecom SGPS SA EUR 5 -2,65 0,08 Cointegrated* -0,14 0,94 Unit root*** -1,51 0,53 Unit root***
PPR SA EUR 5 -1,95 0,31 Not cointegrated -0,56 0,87 Unit root*** -1,01 0,75 Unit root***
Rabobank Nederland EUR 5 -0,64 0,86 Not cointegrated -2,35 0,16 Unit root*** -0,59 0,87 Unit root***
Renault SA EUR 3 -4,60 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,83 0,36 Unit root*** -2,18 0,21 Unit root***
Renault SA EUR 5 -3,18 0,02 Cointegrated** -1,79 0,39 Unit root*** -1,71 0,43 Unit root***
Repsol YPF SA EUR 3 -2,46 0,12 Not cointegrated -1,07 0,73 Unit root*** -1,56 0,50 Unit root***
Rolls-Royce Group PLC EUR 3 -3,41 0,01 Cointegrated** -1,16 0,69 Unit root*** -1,30 0,63 Unit root***
RWE AG EUR 3 -5,81 0,00 Cointegrated*** -0,07 0,95 Unit root*** -1,71 0,42 Unit root***
RWE AG EUR 5 -6,23 0,00 Cointegrated*** 0,11 0,97 Unit root*** -1,67 0,45 Unit root***
Siemens AG EUR 3 -1,83 0,36 Not cointegrated -1,25 0,65 Unit root*** -1,00 0,75 Unit root***
South Africa Government Inte USD 10 -3,09 0,03 Cointegrated** -0,71 0,84 Unit root*** -0,93 0,78 Unit root***
South Africa Government Inte USD 5 -5,11 0,00 Cointegrated*** -0,64 0,86 Unit root*** -1,35 0,61 Unit root***
TDC A/S EUR 5 -1,67 0,45 Not cointegrated -0,45 0,90 Unit root*** -0,17 0,94 Unit root***
Total SA EUR 3 -2,70 0,07 Cointegrated* -2,16 0,22 Unit root*** -3,62 0,01 Stationary
Total SA EUR 5 -2,53 0,11 Not cointegrated -1,01 0,75 Unit root*** -2,36 0,15 Unit root***
ThyssenKrupp AG EUR 5 -2,86 0,05 Cointegrated* -1,66 0,45 Unit root*** -1,65 0,45 Unit root***
Telecom Italia SpA EUR 10 -3,44 0,01 Cointegrated*** -3,05 0,03 Unit root* -3,23 0,02 Unit root*
Telecom Italia SpA EUR 3 -2,51 0,11 Not cointegrated -2,00 0,29 Unit root*** -1,38 0,59 Unit root***
Telecom Italia SpA EUR 5 -3,27 0,02 Cointegrated** -2,24 0,19 Unit root*** -1,91 0,33 Unit root***
Telefonica SA EUR 3 -1,75 0,41 Not cointegrated -0,74 0,83 Unit root*** -1,87 0,34 Unit root***
Telefonica SA EUR 5 -3,03 0,03 Cointegrated** -0,61 0,87 Unit root*** -1,79 0,39 Unit root***
Tesco PLC EUR 5 0,13 0,97 Not cointegrated -1,95 0,31 Unit root*** -1,52 0,53 Unit root***
Republic of Turkey USD 10 -2,52 0,11 Not cointegrated -1,65 0,46 Unit root*** -1,48 0,55 Unit root***
Republic of Turkey USD 3 -4,62 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,25 0,65 Unit root*** -1,19 0,68 Unit root***
Republic of Turkey USD 5 -3,12 0,03 Cointegrated** -0,67 0,85 Unit root*** -0,98 0,76 Unit root***
Unilever NV EUR 3 -3,09 0,03 Cointegrated** -0,94 0,77 Unit root*** -1,10 0,72 Unit root***
Usinor SA EUR 5 -3,35 0,01 Cointegrated** -1,01 0,75 Unit root*** -1,97 0,30 Unit root***
Vattenfall AB EUR 3 -3,85 0,00 Cointegrated*** -0,79 0,82 Unit root*** -1,59 0,49 Unit root***
Vattenfall AB EUR 5 -2,35 0,16 Not cointegrated -1,46 0,55 Unit root*** -0,38 0,91 Unit root***
Veolia Environnement EUR 5 -2,32 0,17 Not cointegrated -1,70 0,43 Unit root*** -2,03 0,27 Unit root***
Vodafone Group PLC EUR 10 -3,92 0,00 Cointegrated*** -2,71 0,07 Unit root** -1,16 0,69 Unit root***
Vodafone Group PLC EUR 3 -3,05 0,03 Cointegrated** -0,74 0,83 Unit root*** -1,32 0,62 Unit root***
Vodafone Group PLC EUR 5 -2,04 0,27 Not cointegrated -1,70 0,43 Unit root*** -0,88 0,79 Unit root***
Volkswagen AG EUR 3 -4,32 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,87 0,35 Unit root*** -1,67 0,44 Unit root***
Volkswagen AG EUR 5 -3,31 0,01 Cointegrated** -1,98 0,29 Unit root*** -2,62 0,09 Unit root**
Wells Fargo & Co USD 5 -5,00 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,06 0,73 Unit root*** -3,82 0,00 Stationary
Washington Mutual Inc USD 5 -3,62 0,00 Cointegrated*** -1,59 0,49 Unit root*** -3,78 0,00 Stationary
Wal-Mart Stores Inc USD 5 -3,81 0,00 Cointegrated*** -2,00 0,29 Unit root*** -2,91 0,05 Unit root*
Basis CDS premium Asset swap spread
For the CDS and asset swap unit root tests, unit root*, unit root** and unit root*** mean that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 1%,
5% or 10% level, respectively. For the basis unit root tests, cointegration*, cointegration** and cointegration*** mean that the null of a unit
root is rejected at the 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively. 
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